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ABSTRACT
JENNIFER S. RHEE: ESSAYS IN INTERNATIONAL ECONOMICS USING FIRM-LEVEL
DATA.
(Under the direction of Anusha Chari)
My dissertation empirically investigates implications of macroeconomic models using firm-
level market and accounting data. As Konchitchki and Patatoukas (2014) states, ”macroeconomics
research has evolved independently from accounting research, which is typically conducted at
the firm level” and ”the link between accounting earnings and macroeconomy remains relatively
unexplored.” This paper is part of the growing body of literature that attempts to fill this gap by
highlighting macroeconomic insights that can be obtained from the micro-level analysis. The first
two chapters of my dissertation investigate Lucas Paradox and the neoclassical model, and the last
chapter studies Heckscher-Ohlin model of trade.
Neoclassical theory predicts that if two countries share the same constant return to scale pro-
duction function, and trade in capital goods is free and competitive, due to the law of diminishing
returns (a) new investment will occur only in capital-scarce countries since (b) the marginal prod-
uct of capital should be higher in economies with less capital. This statement at the heart of Lucas
paradox, implicitly assumes that cross-country marginal products of capital mirror cross-country
financial investment returns. In the first chapter, I show using firm-level data that although firms
in emerging markets enjoy higher marginal products of capital, financial investment returns are
roughly equalized across developed and emerging economies. The finding questions the validity of
the standard approach that uses differences in marginal products of capital to explain international
capital flows. It further suggests that “there is no prima facie support for the view that international
credit frictions play a major role in preventing capital flows from rich to poor countries” (Caselli
and Feyrer, 2007). The paper also highlights the importance of cross-country differences in capital
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efficiency to explain the observed patterns of financial returns. The second chapter further inves-
tigates capital efficiency differences across countries and suggests potential modifications to the
standard capital accumulation model. It also uses variables that are commonly employed in the
macroeconomic growth literature and examine their effect on the capital efficiency of firms.
The third chapter investigates single-cone Heckscher-Ohlin model of specialization, which is
one of the most heavily used general equilibrium model of international trade. The theory suggests
that if countries share identical technology, then they export goods that intensively use the factors
of production that are relatively abundant locally and this leads to a global factor price equalization
even in the absence of international factor mobility. In this chapter, I empirically investigate im-
plications of the single-cone Heckscher-Ohlin model using firm-level accounting and market data.
I find a systematic relationship between firm return to capital and aggregate relative endowment,
which imply a weak link among international factor prices. This finding, which is consistent with
Schott (2003, 2004), rejects commonly used single-cone model in favor of the multi-cone model
with intra-industry specialization and suggests that trade liberalization can only have a limited
effect on the factor price convergence across countries.
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CHAPTER 1
THE LUCAS PARADOX AND THE RETURN TO CAPITAL IN CAPITAL-SCARCE
COUNTRIES
1.1 Introduction
Textbook neoclassical theory predicts that if two countries share identical production functions,
and trade in capital goods is free and competitive, new investment will only occur in economies
with relatively less capital. It follows from the law of diminishing returns that the marginal product
of capital ought to be higher in capital-scarce economies. However, since Lucas (1990) a vast
literature devotes itself to explain the observation that capital flows from developed to emerging
countries fall short of what theory predicts. In fact, in their 2007 paper, Prasad, et al., document
an uphill flow of capital from poor to rich countries in the late 1990s-early 2000s. So, why doesn’t
capital flow from developed to developing countries?
In this essay, I investigate the link between the marginal product of capital and financial rates
of return to provide resolution to the paradoxical patterns of observed international capital flows.
In the standard neoclassical model, a firm’s first order condition states that the marginal product of
capital (MPKt) and the financial return (rt) should differ only by depreciation rate (δ), which is
assumed constant across countries (rt = MPKt−δ). Therefore, theory predicts that high financial
returns and high marginal products of capital should go hand in hand. If this link breaks down, i.e.,
if high marginal product of capital does not translate to high financial returns, it is not clear that
the capital ought to flow to countries with high marginal products of capital.
Despite the significance of this first order condition that lies at the heart of the Lucas Paradox,
there is little attempt to test its validity. In large part, this is due to the limitations of aggregate data.
In this paper, I examine the validity of the link between the marginal product of capital and financial
returns using firm-level market and accounting data from a set of developed and emerging countries
between 1997 and 2014. Konchitchki and Patatoukas (2014) state, ”macroeconomics research has
evolved independently from accounting research, which is typically conducted at the firm level”
and ”the link between accounting earnings and macroeconomy remains relatively unexplored.”
This essay is part of the growing body of literature that attempts to fill this gap by highlighting
macroeconomic insights that can be obtained from the micro-level analysis.
The standard approach in recent work imputes an aggregate marginal product of capital from
national income accounts. However, imputed estimates are not the same as computed ones. Impu-
tations rely heavily on underlying assumptions about functional form, raising legitimate questions
about the validity of a range of assumptions such as setting parameter values (e.g., technology,
capital shares, and elasticities of substitution) equal to those of the US. Specifically, delivering the
finding that marginal products of capital are essentially the same across rich and poor countries
requires adjustments to the national income accounts for (i) the capital per effective worker and a
human capital externality (Lucas, 1990), (ii) non-reproducible capital and the price of capital goods
(Caselli and Feyrer, 2007), and (iii) technology catch up and distortions in saving and investment
decisions (Gourinchas and Jeanne, 2009).
Imputed estimates are therefore indirect estimates of the aggregate rate of return to capital
in developing countries. On the other hand, computed estimates of the return to capital using
micro-data may provide a more direct and reliable way forward. Instead of making assumptions
about parameters to impute the rate of return to capital from aggregate data, I argue that it is more
straightforward to compute firm-level rates of return and to aggregate them to produce estimates
of the national rate of return.
The main finding of this paper is that the standard link between the marginal product of capital
and the financial return, that is often assumed in the international capital flows literature, does not
hold across in a sample of developed and emerging countries between 1997-2014. Consistent with
predictions from the neoclassical framework, the results show that firm marginal products of cap-
ital are indeed higher in emerging countries relative to their developed-market counterparts. The
finding is robust to controlling for firm and industry specific effects and is remarkably consistent
across different sample periods and countries.
The neoclassical model implies that the higher marginal product of capital should translate to a
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high financial return in emerging-markets. However, contrary to this prediction, I find that despite
evidence for a downward sloping marginal product of capital curve, the inflation-adjusted financial
return is roughly equal across developed and emerging countries. This core finding is significant
as it questions the validity of the standard approach that uses differences in the marginal product
of capital to explain international capital flow patterns. The firm-level evidence using computed
estimates therefore shows that the marginal product of capital may not be a valid proxy for financial
returns expected from the capital investment.
Additionally, the results confirm that ”there is no prima facie support for the view that inter-
national credit frictions play a major role in preventing capital flows from rich to poor countries”
(Caselli and Feyrer, 2007). If a high marginal product of capital in emerging countries correctly
translates to high financial returns as implied by the standard model, then the shortfall in the capital
flow to these countries points international capital market frictions and investment barriers. How-
ever, if financial returns are equalized across developed and emerging countries, an alternative
hypothesis may be that there is little incentive for capital to flow to the less-developed countries.
These findings further highlight the importance of cross-country capital efficiency differences
to explain the Lucas Paradox. Much of the international macro and growth literature, which uses
cross-country marginal product of capital differences to explain international capital flow patterns,
focuses on productivity differences across countries and the macroeconomic factors that affect
productive efficiency, i.e., the level of output that can be obtained from a unit of the capital input.
The findings of this paper highlight the importance of capital efficiency, i.e., the level of future
capital input that can be obtained from a unit investment today. This relationship affects the capital
accumulation process within the economy and determines the relationship between the marginal
product of capital and financial returns.
The firm’s first order condition that links the marginal product of capital and financial returns
stems from the standard capital accumulation equation, which suggests that the capital stock to-
morrow is the sum of capital stock today and the investment net of the depreciation (Kt+1 =
(1− δ)Kt + It such that Kt and It are the capital stock, and investment in period t, respectively).
However, if a unit investment does not lead to a unit increase in the capital stock, the standard
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link between the investment return and marginal product of capital no longer holds, and the cross-
country investment return and marginal product of capital patterns can differ.1
As Alfaro, et al (2008) states, “theoretical explanations for the Lucas Paradox can be grouped
into two categories. The first group includes differences in fundamentals that affect the produc-
tion structure of the economy, such as technological differences, missing factors of production,
government policies, and the institutional structure. The second group of explanations focuses
on international capital market imperfections, mainly sovereign risk and asymmetric information.”
Some of the major works on international capital market frictions include Stulz (2005), which
shows that agency problems in emerging countries can lead to a wedge in the investment returns
received by the international and domestic investors, and Reinhart and Rogoff (2004), which high-
lights the default history of emerging market countries. This finding suggest that the credit risk
can explain the paucity of capital flow to emerging countries. Montiel (2006) also proposes an in-
formation friction as an important determinant in explaining the paucity of capital flows to African
countries. On the other hand, much of the international macro and growth literature, which uses
cross-country marginal product of capital differences to explain international capital flow patterns,
focus on macroeconomic fundamentals and endowments that affect productive efficiency.2
In their 2005 paper, Banerjee and Duflo outline an exhaustive list of indirect and direct meth-
ods used to calibrate the marginal product of capital in the empirical development literature. An
indirect method often employed in the literature proxies for the firm return to capital using the in-
terest rate. Therefore a long line of researchers study of lending market in the emerging countries,
and they document the extremely high cost of borrowing in these countries even when one adjusts
for the risk. For example, Timberg and Aiyar (1984) document a 21− 120% interest rate charged
by the indigenous-style bankers in India, and Ghate (1992) shows that interest rates in northern
Thailand range up to 5− 7% per month.
However, as stated in Caselli and Feyrer (2007), “in financially repressed/distorted economies,
interest rates on financial assets may be very poor proxies for the cost of capital actually borne
1See Cochrane (1991), Hayashi (1982), and Abel and Blanchard (1986)
2see Lucas(1990) and King and Rebelo (1993)
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by firms.” More popular and direct estimates of marginal product of capital require one to posit
a production function (usually Cobb-Douglas) and derive the expression for marginal product of
capital based on the assumed equation. This is the approach employed by Lucas in his 1990 paper,
and he shows that marginal product of capital difference across countries fall substantially when
one adjust for productivity difference across countries. A more recent paper by Caselli and Feyrer
(2007) finds that the return to capital is roughly equal between emerging and developed countries
when one adjusts for the relative price of capital, and the complementary factors of production.
Within this extensive literature on Lucas Paradox, there has been a relatively little discussion
about the link between the marginal product of capital and the investment return. In large part,
this is because in aggregate data, capital is not observed and therefore estimated from aggregate
investment using the perpetual inventory method, which requires one to posit a capital accumu-
lation process. Since this process is typically assumed to follow a standard model where a unit
increase in investment lead to a unit increase in capital stock3, the aggregate capital stock estimate
itself implicitly relies on the assumption that the standard link between marginal product of capital
and the investment return holds. This makes it virtually impossible to test the validity of the link
using aggregate data. The key advantage of a firm-level data is that unlike aggregate estimates,
capital can be directly observed from the accounting and market values. This allows for direct
computation of the marginal product of capital and investment returns, which can then be used to
empirically test the validity of the standard link between the two variables.
Despite the advantages of firm-level data, there are some drawbacks. For example, firm-level
data do not provide any insight into the productivity of self-employed workers or informal sector
firms. This is a significant drawback as these types of households and firms constitute a large
part of the economy in developing countries. Unlike aggregate data, firm-level market variables
are also susceptible to market volatility. Since the period of analysis includes the global financial
crisis (2007-2008), I control for year-specific effects in my analysis and also run a robustness test
3Cochrane (1991) is an exception in that he uses non-standard capital accumulation process with adjustment cost
to estimate capital stock. However, he also sets the adjustment parameter so that the mean aggregate investment and
stock returns equate.
5
excluding these years. Despite these shortcomings, the firm-level data provide useful insights as
they utilize detailed information on the relationship between financial returns and productivity of
the firms. This paper therefore provides an alternative lens to complement existing literature that
primarily uses macroeconomic data to perform aggregate analysis.
The paper limits the analysis to listed-firms in MSCI emerging and developed countries that
have relatively well established stock markets. Although this substantially reduces the number
of countries in the sample, as Reinhart and Rogoff (2004) write ”roughly twenty five ’emerging
markets’ account for the bulk of international financial flows.” Therefore, the analysis of the firms
in these countries ought to provide useful insights into the factors that drive the international capital
flows. I also restrict the period of analysis to the post-1996 period due to the limited availability of
reliable firm-level data from emerging countries in the early 1990s.
An important concern with using cross-country firm-level data is the difference in the account-
ing standards used to report data from different countries. For example, the definition of ”assets” in
the US Generally Accepted Accounting Principles (US GAAP) may differ from the definition in the
International Financial Reporting Standard (IFRS). To minimize the effects of the cross-country ac-
counting standard differences, I use the financial and accounting data from the Worldscope Datas-
tream. Datastream not only provides extensive accounting and market data on listed firms across
countries, but also aims to ”provide the data in a manner that allows maximum comparability be-
tween one company and another, and between various reporting regimes” (Worldscope/Disclosure
Partners, 1992). Thus, the numbers reported in the firm’s annual/quarterly audit reports could dif-
fer from the numbers provided by the Worldscope as they make ”several adjustments to the data
to make the definitions more comparable to their U.S. counterparts.” (Wald, 1999) Although ex-
tensive measures are taken by Datastream to increase the firm comparability across countries, I
further check for the effects of cross-country differences in accounting standards that may remain
in the data, by running a robustness test exclusively restricted to firms from countries that adopt the
International Financial Accounting Standards (IFRS). I find that the main results remain robust.
The findings in this paper are closely related to Gourinchas and Jeanne (2009), Banerjee and
Duflo (2005), and Chirinko and Mallik (2008). Although the approaches differ, these papers all
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investigate the effect of domestic capital friction on the cross-country marginal product of capital
differences. Gourinchas and Jeanne (2009) show that one can reconcile the observed difference
between aggregate capital return and the international capital flow using the saving and investment
wedge, and Chirinko and Mallik (2008) investigate the role of capital adjustment cost at an aggre-
gate level using a stock market return. Banerjee and Duflo (2005) show that one can partially ex-
plain the cross-country difference in marginal product of capital by adjusting for the intra-country
heterogeneity in the firm productivity.4 However, this paper differs from others in that it studies
the effect of domestic capital frictions on the relationship between the marginal product of capital
and the investment returns rather than the marginal product of capital itself.
The paper proceeds as follows. In section 2, I introduce the basic neoclassical model and its
predictions about the relationship between the marginal product of capital and financial investment
returns and explain the empirical methodology. Section 3 describes the firm-level data used in the
analysis and the summary statistics. Section 4 present the empirical results; I analyze the cross-
country marginal product of capital and investment return patterns in the section. I also perform
a robustness test by using only the firms in countries with IFRS accounting standards. Section
5 provides additional robustness test results for labor input and tax adjustments, and section 6
concludes.
1.2 Benchmark model and Empirical Methodology
In this section, I introduce the benchmark neoclassical model to motive Lucas Paradox, and de-
scribe the empirical methodology used to calibrate the marginal product of capital and investment
return using the firm-level data.
1.2.1 Benchmark: Neoclassical model
In this subsection, I introduce a standard neoclassical model with perfectly competitive factor
markets. This simple, benchmark model delivers useful predictions and illustrates the first order
condition that I use to motivate the empirical analysis.
4Hsieh & Klenow (2009) and Alfaro, et al (2008) also study the domestic capital market imperfection (misalloca-
tion of capital within countries), but their analysis focus on TFP and income difference across countries rather than
return differences.
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Consider a standard neoclassical economy where the representative firm faces competitive fac-
tor and goods markets. The firm chooses a capital, investment, and labor ({Kt, It, Lt}∞t0 ) to maxi-
mize the net present value of the future cash flows, taking the interest rate as given:
max
{Kt,It,Lt}∞t0
∑
t≥t0
1
Rt
(Yt − It − wtLt) (1.1)
subject to:
Production function: Yt = F (Kt, Lt) (1.2)
Capital accumulation: Kt+1 = G(Kt, It) = (1− δ)Kt + It (1.3)
Definition: Rt = (1 + rt)(1 + rt−1)...(1 + rt0) (1.4)
Yt is the period output of the representative firm which is a function of capital and labor input,
and the wt is the exogenously determined wage. Note that in a standard model, period t+ 1 capital
stock (Kt+1) is sum of period t capital stock(Kt) and investment (It) net of depreciation (δKt);
therefore, a unit increase in investment lead to a unit increase in future capital stock. There is no
capital rental market in this economy as the firms own the capital used in the production. Rt is the
aggregate compounded investment return from period t0 to t and δ is the depreciation rate of the
physical capital, which is assumed constant. The first order conditions yield:
1 + rt =
(
F1(Kt, Lt) +
G1(Kt, It)
G2(Kt, It)
)
G2(Kt−1, It−1)
= F1(Kt, Lt) + 1− δ (1.5)
F2(Kt, Lt) = wt (1.6)
for all periods t > t0.5 It is evident from equation (1.5) that the key determinant of the relationship
5Note that equation (1.5) can also be written as 1 + rt =
F1(Kt,Lt)
p
kt
t−1
+ (1 − δ)p
kt+1
t
p
kt
t−1
such that pkt+1t is the relative
price of installed capital in period t+ 1 in period t output. This follows from the fact that G2(Kt, It) is the marginal
rate of transformation of a consumption good in period t to installed capital in period t+1 (Cochrane, 1991). Therefore
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between the period marginal product of capital (F1(Kt, Lt)) and the investment return (rt) is the
capital accumulation equation(G(Kt, It)). Thus, if there exists any friction in the capital accumu-
lation process, then the cross-country investment return and marginal product of capital patterns
may diverge.
Assuming a constant return to scale Cobb-Douglas production function(Y = AKαL1−α),
F1(Kt, Lt) = AαK
α−1
t L
1−α
t
= αA
1
αy
α−1
α
t (1.8)
such that yt = YtLt and A is total factor of productivity or productive efficiency. The capital share of
output (α) is assumed less than unity.
Since I assume that all firms in the economy share an identical production function, the output
per unit labor should be identical across all entities. It follows from equations (1.5) and (1.8) that
both the period investment return and marginal product of capital should decline with increases
in output per unit labor. With these simplifying assumptions, the model predicts that firm-level
marginal products of capital and investment returns should on average slope downwards when
plotted against the aggregate output per unit labor. In this paper, I test these implications of the
model using firm level data.
1.2.2 Empirical Methodology
In this subsection, I describe the methodology to estimate marginal products of capital and
investment returns used in the empirical analysis. To proxy for the two variables of interest, I use
accounting and finance measures of profitability with some modifications to better align them with
the economic definitions described in the standard model.
in equilibrium, the price of an installed capital in period t+ 1 in period t output is
p
Kt+1
t =
1
G2(Kt, It)
(1.7)
and F1(Kt,Lt)
p
kt
t−1
is a price corrected measure of marginal product of capital that is consistent with Caselli and Feyrer
(2007). With a standard capital accumulation equation, pkt+1t = 1 for all t, which suggests that buying a unit of capital
at time t costs a unit of consumption good. However, the relative price can diverge from a unity if there exists any
friction in the capital accumulation process.
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From equation (1.8), one can easily derive the following expression for marginal product of
capital.
F1(Kt, Lt) = α
y
k
(1.9)
Since α is the capital share in output, this expression suggests that the marginal product of capital
is the ratio between the portion of earnings that accrue to capital holders (in the model these is
simply the firm), and the firm’s assets.6 The empirical estimations use the return on assets(ROA)
as a measure of the marginal product of capital as follows:
ROAc,t,i,f =
EBITDAc,t,i,f
(MVAc,t1,i,f )(1+inflc,t)
(1.10)
EBITDAc,t,i,f is the earnings before interest, tax, depreciation and amortization, and measures
the income that accrues to capital holders or the firm f in industry i in period t in country c. I use
this measure of earning rather than net income since the model assumes that, the firm owns all of its
capital assets, and therefore there are no interest costs. In the analysis, and following accounting
practice, I further adjust this measure of income for extraordinary gains/costs. The adjustment
is necessary as these costs/gains are often unrelated to everyday business operations which is of
interest in the model, and can increase the volatility of earnings by inflating or deflating the income
from the operations.7 MVAc,t,i,f is the current market value of the firm’s assets8, and is defined as
MVAc,t,i,f = Debtc,t,i,f + MVc,t,i,f . Debtc,t,i,f is the book value of debt and the MVc,t,i,f is the
market value of equity for the firm f in industry i in period t in country c. Poterba(1998) uses a
similar measure to estimate the return to tangible capital at an aggregate level.
This measure differs from the standard accounting ROA, which uses the book value of the
6Note that this general expression of the marginal product of capital should hold even if the firms have increas-
ing/decreasing return to scale Cobb-Douglas type production function
7The main empirical result of the analysis, however, remains robust even with the extraordinary costs/gains
8note that this is also the replacement value of the asset based on the q-theory of investment and is similar to the
measure used in Fama and French (1999)
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assets in the denominator as the measure of capital. Although this ratio is widely used in finance
and accounting9, assets on the balance sheet are measured at the acquisition cost. As the market
value of an asset can change over time (e.g., the value of buildings or land may appreciate as urban
centers develop), the value of assets on financial statements may not correctly reflect current values
and may even lead to a misleading result. Therefore, I replace the denominator of the indicator
with the sum of the book value of debt and market value of equity. As total assets necessarily equal
the sum of liabilities and equity, this ought to provide a more accurate estimate of the replacement
value of an asset in period t − 1 under perfect capital markets.10 The value of assets at the end of
period t− 1 is used in the denominator as a measure of what the firm owns entering period t. This
is the capital that is employed during period t to generate the income EBITDAc,t,i,f . Due to the
time discrepancy between the measurement of the capital stock and income, assets are adjusted for
inflation using inflc,t, which is consumer price inflation in country c during period t.
To derive a testable expression for the investment return, I use equation (3), which can be
rewritten as:
1− δ = Kt+1 − It
Kt
(1.3a)
If the equation (5) holds true,
rt =
αYt − It +Kt+1 −Kt
Kt
(1.11)
Note that this is the internal rate of return equation commonly used in finance to assess the prof-
itability of an investment 11. It measures the investment return that capital owners can receive by
purchasing one unit of capital at time t, and selling it at period t+1.
9See Eisenberg, et al (1998), Guenther and Young (2000), Chaney, et al (2004), Bowen, et al (2008)
10Debt also enters financial statements at a historical cost, and the interest rate on debt may differ across time.
However, the income used in the analysis is income before the interest, and therefore, even if debt is refinanced at a
”current” rate of interest, it should not affect the ROA measure used in the analysis.
11see Gordon (1974), Salamon(1985), Fama and French(1999), Graham and Harvey(2001)
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Using equation (11) as the benchmark, I derive the following expression to measure the invest-
ment return:
IRRc,t,i,f =
EBITDAc,t,i,f+[−Adj∆Assetc,t,i,f+MVAc,t,i,f−MVAc,t−1,i,f ]
MVAc,t−1,i,f
− inflc,t (1.12)
This definition is similar to a period investment return measure employed by Fama and French
(1999) for the US stock market. In their paper, this estimate is termed “internal rate of return on
value” and is used as the measure of “the return required by investors,” or more precisely, “an esti-
mate of what an investor would have earned during our sample period by passively investing in all
corporate securities as they enter the sample.” Adj∆Assetc,t,i,f is a measure of period investment,
which is defined as Adj∆Assetc,t,i,f = ∆Assetc,t,i,f + Depreciationc,t,i,f . ∆Assetc,t,i,f is the
change in the book value of assets. This measures the current value of tangible asset investments
by firms as financial statements are filed using the historical basis approach, i.e., assets are valued
at the acquisition price. I note that this measure of investment does not include a significant portion
of the R&D spending by the firm. Due to accounting conservatism and uncertainty about the suc-
cess of the R&D activity, R& D spending is considered as a cost rather than an asset, and is thus,
expensed. These R&D spending, however, should be captured in EBITDAc,t,i,f , and therefore
the overall measure of investment return remains unaffected.
If the capital accumulation process outlined in equation (3) accurately describes the data, the
values inside the square bracket equals−δMV Ac,t−1,i,f , and IRRc,t,i,f = ROAc,t,i,f−δ, as implied
by the model. I further adjust the investment return for inflation in the respective countries to
estimate the real return.
1.3 Data and Summary Statistics
Financial and market data used to calculate the firm-level marginal product of capital and in-
vestment return are from Worldscope Datastream. Datastream is a preferred source of data for the
cross-country comparison because it not only provides an extensive accounting and market data
on listed firms across countries, but also aims to “provide the data in a manner that allows max-
imum comparability between one company and another, and between various reporting regimes”
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(Worldscope/Disclosure Partners, 1992). These adjustments by the Worldscope help minimize the
potential bias from the cross-country differences in accounting standards.
Although Datastream takes extensive measures to increase the accounting comparability across
countries, I further check for the effects of cross-country differences in accounting standards by
running robustness test restricting the analysis to the countries that adopted IFRS. Since the mid-
2000s there has been increasing attempt led by Euro-zone countries to unify the accounting stan-
dards across countries. This has led to a formation of International Accounting Standards Boards
(IASB), with the explicit goal “to develop an internationally acceptable set of high quality finan-
cial reporting standards.” (Barth, et al 2008) Although the United States is yet to adopt IFRS, the
standard has been adopted in EU countries by 2005, and majority of MSCI developed and emerg-
ing countries by 2011–a list is available in the Appendix. Many other countries that are yet to
adopt IFRS have announced their plans for convergence in the near future. For example, India’s
Ministry of Corporate Affairs released a roadmap for the convergence with the IFRS, and all In-
dian companies whose securities traded in a public market other than the SME Exchange, will be
required to use IFRS by 2017. These efforts may lead to even greater data comparability going
forward facilitating firm-level research. In this paper, I find that the main results remain robust to
the cross-country differences in accounting standards.
The countries used in the analysis are MSCI emerging and developed countries that have rela-
tively well established stock markets.12 Exchange floor in developing countries are often very new
(e.g., Laos opened its stock exchange in 2011, Syria in 2009, and Somalia in 2012), and in many
cases Datastream does not carry data on the firms traded on these exchanges as the market capi-
talization of these countries is very small (e.g., the Maldives Stock Exchange had only five firms
listed as of 2008). Some developing countries do not have a national stock exchange (e.g., Angola,
Brunei). Restricting the analysis to MSCI emerging and developed countries reduces the countries
in the sample, but as Reinhart and Rogoff (2004) point out “roughly 25 ’emerging markets’ ac-
count for the bulk of the financial flows”. Therefore, analyzing the marginal product of capital and
12Saudi Arabia is dropped from the sample due to the limited availability of the firm-level data in early-2000s.
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the investment return of the firms in MSCI developed and emerging countries can provide useful
insights into factors that drive international capital flows.
The period of analysis is 1997− 2014. A long period is preferred for the analysis as it provides
more reliable estimates of ROA and IRR patterns, but unlike macroeconomic aggregate data, which
date back to mid-1900s, firm level data for emerging countries are often unavailable before 1995.
Even though the estimation period used in the paper is relatively short compared to papers that
use macroeconomic data, the period after 1995 is characterized by a large volume of international
capital investment following ”a series of trade and financial liberalization programs undertaken
since the mid-1980s.” (Kose, Prasad, and Terrones (2006)). Therefore, the period post-1990 is
especially relevant for answering questions related to the marginal product of capital, investment
returns and the observed patterns of international capital flows. A major drawback, however, is that
the sample period includes the Global Financial Crisis, characterized by high levels of volatility
in both earnings and market values. Thus, in the empirical analysis, I control for the time specific
effect and also run a robustness check excluding the crisis period.
Within the Worldscope dataset, I exclude firm-years with missing market value, assets, lia-
bilities, depreciation, EBITDA or extraordinary gains/cost. I also drop balance-sheet insolvent
firm-years when total liabilities exceed total assets. As period t− 1 asset values are used to calcu-
late the period t ROA and IRR, firm-years without debt and market value from the previous year
are also excluded from the sample.
The remaining data are winsorized at 1% and 99% by country to control for the outliers, fol-
lowing the accounting practice.13 I repeat the analysis without the winsorization, and the results
remain unchanged. To adjust for the industry-specific effects, I sort the firms into the Fama-French
48 industries.14. Firms in the financial sector are dropped from the analysis as the paper focuses
on the real economy. To test for the robustness of the empirical results to changes in the industry
13Some of the major outliers in the sample are due to merger/acquisitions. Consider a listed firm that merged with
another (listed or unlisted) firm in January 2000. The ROA2000 will be the ratio between the post-merger EBITDA,
and the pre-merger asset value, and the indicator will be highly inflated. Major mergers are highly uncommon, but
they can upwardly bias the results.
14The actual number of industries used in the analysis is 44, as 4 financial industries are dropped from the sample
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classification schemes, I repeat the exercise using the 2-digit SIC (Standard Industry Classifica-
tion) codes. After these exclusions, the main analysis uses 334,608 firm-years across 42 countries.
Table 1 provides summary statistics for the raw data.
Table 1 shows that there is a large variation in the sample size across countries. The US has
the largest sample size with 69,400 firm-years, closely followed by Japan with 52,501 firm-years.
The sample size is the smallest for Colombia, which has only 365 firm-years. Industry diversity
also differs across countries; all 44 Fama-French (FF) industries are observed in Australia, China,
Canada, India, United Kingdom and the United States. On the other hand, only 23 FF industries
are observed in Hungary. Purchasing power parity (PPP) adjusted real GDP15, population, employ-
ment, and average hours worked per employed are from the Penn World Tables 9.0. As data on
average hours worked is not available for China, I use GDP per capita as the baseline measure of
output per unit labor in this paper; I later check the robustness of the result using the GDP per hour
worked and find that the result remain unchanged. Consumer price indices are from the World
Bank database.
Table 2 provides summary statistics for the return on assets (ROA) and internal rate of return
(IRR) estimates across countries. The data show two idiosyncrasies. First, the mean ROA for
Australia is negative during the analysis period (1997-2014). This is due to the significant under-
performance of the metal mining industry during and after the financial crisis, and excluding the
metal mining companies (SIC 2-digit code: 10), Australia’s mean ROA turns positive.
Second, across the MSCI developed and emerging countries the average IRR is greater than
the average ROA, a finding which seems at odds with the implications of the standard model
(r = MPK − δ). The mean IRR across MSCI developed and emerging countries between 1997
and 2014 is 9.2% and the mean ROA is 7.6%. However, upon further examination this pattern is
due to a large rightward skewness in the distribution of IRR, illustrated in Figure 1. The graph
shows that compared to the ROA distribution (Figure 1a), which is almost perfectly symmetric
across the mean, the IRR distribution (Figure 1b) is skewed to the right.
15A detailed discussion about the construction of the PPP adjusted GDP is available on Feestra, et al (2015)
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This pattern is also seen in the difference between the means and the medians in Table 2. The
mean and the median ROA almost perfectly align with each other with a less than 1% difference
between the two values. On the other hand, the mean and the median IRR differ by 6.4%! Due
to the right skewness, even when the mean IRR is higher than the mean ROA, the median IRR
is substantially lower than the median ROA. Thus, in the following section, I analyze not only
the average cross-country patterns, but also the median trend across countries, to check for the
effects of the skewness. The IRR is also substantially more volatile relative to ROA. The aggregate
standard deviation for the ROA is 10%, but it is 49% for the IRR.
Figure 2 shows the two-way scatter plot between the median firm level ROA and IRR against
the mean log(PCGDP) between 1997 and 2014. The figure also include the best fit line for the
mean trend. Figure 2a is the two-way plot for the median ROA and the mean log(PCGDP); it
shows a clear negative correlation between the two variables and a steep downward sloping best-fit
line. On the other hand, the figure 2b, which is the two-way plot for the median IRR and the mean
log(PCGDP), shows a positive correlation between the two variables and an upward sloping best-
fit line suggesting a potential deviation between the cross-country marginal product of capital and
the financial return patterns. While this positive financial return trend contradicts the predictions
of the neoclassical model, it is consistent with the international capital flow pattern documented in
Prasad, et al (2007). In the paper, they show that ”the relative income of [current account] surplus
countries has fallen below that of deficit countries. Not only is capital not flowing from rich to
poor countries, in quantities the neoclassical model would predict–a paradox pointed out by Lucas
(1990)– but, in the last few years it has been flowing from poor to rich countries”.
Although the scatter plots are highly revealing, the trend may be driven by firm-specific factors;
the firms in emerging countries may engage in more risky business, and may face greater financial
constraints relative to their peers in the developed markets. Therefore, in the following section, I
conduct empirical analysis controlling for the firm and industry specific factors that could have led
to the observed results.
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1.4 Cross Country Marginal Products of Capital and Investment Return Patterns
The standard neoclassical model predicts that both firm-level marginal product of capital and
investment return will correlate negatively with per capital GDP. In this section, I conduct empirical
analysis to test the implications of the standard model using firm-level data.
1.4.1 Firm-Level Return on Assets and Per Capita GDP
To formally assess the relationship between aggregate output per unit labor and the firm level
profitability (return on assets), I estimate the following benchmark specification:
MPKc,t,i,f = α + β1log(PCGDPc,t) + β2Dt + β3Fi + γXc,t,i,f + c,t,i,f (1.13)
MPKc,t,i,f is the return on assets (ROA) for a firm f in industry i in country c in period t, and
PCGDPc,t is the purchasing power parity adjusted real per capita GDP in country c in period t
in 2011 US dollars that I use as a proxy for output per unit labor. Dt and Fi are time and in-
dustry dummies that are added to control for global macroeconomic shocks that occurred during
the period of analysis, or an industry specific trend. Xc,t,i,f is the vector of firm specific factors,
which includes the log size (the book value of assets denominated in USD; the value is adjusted
for the inflation using the CPI index), leverage (book debt to equity ratio), and the equity price-
to-book ratio. This vector adjusts for firm-specific risk, which are absent in the standard model.
This vector of firm specific factors is motivated by Fama and French (1992); in the paper authors
write that “if assets are priced rationally, our results suggest that stock risks are multidimensional.
One dimension of risk is proxied by size, ME. Another dimension of risk is proxied by BE/ME,
the ratio of the book value of common equity to its market value.” Leverage is added for com-
pleteness although the effect of leverage on the return is debated in the literature.16 Note that the
riskiness of the firm is expected to rise with a decrease in size and an increase in leverage and the
price to book ratio. Errors are clustered in country-year to control for the firm-level error corre-
lation within the country-year groups. As stated in their heavily cited paper, Cameron and Miller
16see Fama and French (1992), Penman, et al (2007)
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(2015) write, “[f]ailure to control for within-cluster error correlation can lead to very misleadingly
small standard errors, and consequent misleadingly narrow confidence intervals, large t-statistics
and low p-values.” Therefore clustering of errors should enhance the precision of the coefficient
estimates.17
I do not include the country fixed effect in the benchmark regression due to the relatively
moderate time dimension of the dataset (less than 20 years). Although country fixed effect is an
attractive way to control for unobserved non-time varying country characteristics, “[i]nclusion of
country fixed effects also affects the estimated coefficients of explanatory variables... Coefficients
on country variables that are constant (such as geographical features and colonial history) cannot
be estimated at all, and variables that have little within-country time variation cannot be estimated
with precision.”(Barro, 2012). Considering the relatively small change in PPP adjusted PCGDP
in 1997-2014 period especially among developed countries, the bias from the inclusion of country
fixed effect is unlikely to be negligible. However, in appendix I do present the regression result
with country fixed effect for periods 1997-2014 for robustness, and I find that the main result
remain unchanged.18
Table 3 reports the results from the regression model. Column (1) shows the results for the
MSCI developed and emerging countries between 1997 and 2014. Size has a statistically signifi-
cant positive effect on the return on assets, and the price to book ratio and leverage have a negative
and significant effect confirming the prediction that firm-level ROA rises with the increase in the
firm specific risk. The statistically significant negative relationship between per capital GDP and
the firm ROA shows that the implication of the standard neoclassical model holds during the period
across firms in MSCI developed and emerging countries and controlling for the firm, industry, and
time specific effects. In other words, as the model predicts the firm ROA falls with increases in the
17The errors are clustered by country-year rather than country due to limited number of country clusters. Camerona
and Miler (2015) state “we note that there is no specific point at which we need to worry about few clusters. Instead,
‘more is better’. Current consensus appears to be that G = 50 is enough for state-year panel data.” The authors also
add that more clusters are needed in case of the unbalanced panel. Since the maximum possible number of country
cluster is 42, which is arguably too few even for the balanced panel, I use country-year cluster for the main analysis.
Regression result with country clusters however, are also presented in the appendix and the findings of the paper do
remain robust.
18Appendix also presents regression results with firm-fixed effect and find that the main findings remain unchanged.
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proxy for labor productivity. This finding also suggests that if, on average, the first order condi-
tion that equates the marginal product of capital and the investment return holds, then investment
returns should also be inversely correlated with per capita GDP.
Column (1) shows that, on average, the firm-level ROA declines with increases in per capita
GDP, but does not provide any insight on how the pattern differs within the sample. For example,
what is the relationship between firm ROA and per capita GDP when we examine high productivity
firms with an above average return on assets. Quantile regressions make up for this shortcoming of
the OLS regression by modeling the relationship between the specified percentile of the response
variable and the control variables, i.e., the median quantile regression portrays the relationship
between the median marginal product of capital and the predictor variables, etc. For a more com-
prehensive analysis, I run a quantile regression for the 25th, 50th (median), and the 75th percentile
firms. Also note that this question is particularly important in analyzing the differences between
internal rates of return (IRR) and the return on assets, due to the high level of skewness observed
in the distribution of the internal rates of return in Table 2.
Columns (2) − (4) show that the coefficient on per capita GDP is consistently statistically
significant across the 25th, 50th, and the 75th percentiles. The negative slope is the steepest for the
firms in the 75th percentile of ROA, and there is a little difference in the slope between the 25th
and the 50th percentile. The finding suggests that the effect of the changes in the aggregate output
per unit labor is most acutely felt by the ”most productive” firms in the economy.
As the data section mentions, the period of analysis includes the global financial crisis, during
which financial systems went through substantial stresses.19 Therefore, I repeat the exercise in
column (1) for the 2011-2014 post-financial crisis period. Due to the short period of analysis, the
values are susceptible to skewness from the market volatility, but the regression results presented
in column (5) confirm the findings in column (1). Columns (6) and (7) check for the effect of the
cross-country differences in the accounting standards. Column (6) repeats the regression in column
(5) using firms from the countries that adopted the International Financial Reporting Standards
19see Hanson, et al (2011)
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(IFRS) during the post-financial crisis period, and the column (7) shows the results using firms
in MSCI EU countries during 2006-2014– the European Union officially adopted IFRS starting
2005.20 This result is particularly insightful as the area enjoys a relative low capital flow barriers
across countries within the Eurozone21 which is consistent with the free-capital flow assumption
within the standard neoclassical model. The results presented in columns (5)-(7) of Table 3 show
that the inverse correlation between per capita GDP and firm-level ROA is surprisingly consistent
across time, and is robust to cross-country differences in accounting standards.
Table 4 examines the relationship between ROA and per capita GDP with industry-level con-
trols. I estimate the following industry by industry regression for each of the 48-Fama French
industry (44 excluding financial industries) using the base sample of firms in the MSCI developed
and emerging countries between 1997 and 2014. Table 4 presents the results.:
MPKc,t,f = α + β1log(PCGDPc,t) + β2Dt + γXc,t,f + c,t,f (1.14)
Table 4 confirms that the cross-country pattern observed in the Table 3 is not industry-specific.
Firm ROAs decline with increases in per capita GDP in almost all 44 non-financial Fama-French
industries. Thirty six industries have statistically significant negative coefficients for per capita
GDP, and only one industry (aircraft manufacturing) has a statistically significant positive coeffi-
cient. The negative coefficient is steepest in the medical and the defense industries, which require
high-levels of human capital. The Appendix presents a similar analysis using SIC 2-digit indus-
tries and the results remain unchanged. A majority of industries have a statistically significant
negative coefficient for per capita GDP, and only a few industries have an insignificant or positive
coefficient.
Table 5 further shows that the observed results are not time-specific. It shows the results for
20see Guggiola (2010)
21“In the EUs single market (sometimes also called the internal market) people , goods , services , and money can
move around the EU as freely as within a single country. ”(European Union, n.d.)
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the following estimating equation using the base sample:
MPKc,i,f = α + β1log(PCGDPc) + β2Fi + γXc,i,f + c,i,f (1.15)
Between 1997 and 2014, we observe a statistically significant negative coefficient for all years.
The coefficient is most negative during the financial crisis (2007 and 2009). The negative coeffi-
cient slowly flattens post-2010, as the developed countries recover. Conversely, the negative slope
is relatively flat during the Asian Financial Crisis (1998) and slowly steepens as the Asian tigers
move out of their deep recessions.
The results presented in this section show that consistent with the neoclassical model, the
marginal product of capital is higher in countries with low per capita GDP. In the following sub-
section, I repeat the exercises using the investment return (IRR).
1.4.2 Investment Returns and Per Capita GDP
In order to test for the validity of the firm first order condition described in equation (6), I use
the following regression specification:
rc,t,i,f = α + β1log(PCGDPc,t) + β2Dt + β3Fi + γXc,t,i,f + c,t,i,f (1.16)
The predictor variables in the equation are identical to those in equation (13), but the dependent
variable is now the internal rate of return (IRRc,t,i,f ). As in the equation (13), firm-level factors
such as size, leverage, and the price to book ratio control for the firm-specific characteristics, and
industry and time dummies control for industry and time specific effects. Errors are also clustered
in country-year groups as in the previous subsection. If the standard relationship between the firm
investment return and marginal product of capital holds, then the internal rate of return should also
be inversely correlated with per capita GDP.
Table 6 presents the results. Column (1) reports the results for the MSCI developed and emerg-
ing countries between 1997 and 2014. Despite the statistically significant negative relationship
with marginal product of capital observed in the previous subsection, the coefficient on per capita
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GDP is not statistically significant when one controls for firm and industry specific factors. This
result implies that the cross-country marginal product of capital and investment return patterns do
not necessarily mirror each other– as the neoclassical model predicts. This finding questions the
validity of the standard approach which uses aggregate marginal product of capital to explain the
pattern of international capital flows. The finding also suggests that even accurate measures of
marginals product of capital may not explain patterns of international capital flows as the marginal
product of capital may be an inaccurate proxy for investment returns.
The finding therefore suggests that “there is no prima facie support for the view that interna-
tional credit frictions play a major role in preventing capital flows from rich to poor countries.”
(Caselli and Feyrer, 2007). As Lucas suggests, if investment returns are inversely correlated with
per capita GDP, capital ought to flow rapidly from developed to emerging market countries and any
deficiencies in these flows imply international financial market frictions. However, the results in
Column (1) suggest that the investment returns are relatively equal across developed and emerging
countries and therefore there may not be an incentive for the capital to flow to the emerging mar-
kets since opportunities with similar investment returns also exist within developed economies.
This empirical evidence does not appear consistent with the claim that international investment
barriers play a major role in explaining the lack of capital flow to emerging countries. A potential
resolution to the Lucas paradox may therefore lie in the cross-firm or cross-industry variation in
internal rates of return within countries.
As in the previous subsection, I run a quantile regression to identify the within sample hetero-
geneity in response to the changes in the per capita GDP. Given the large rightward skewness in the
data from the summary statistics in Table 2, this analysis is particularly important for the internal
rates of return. Compared to the results in Table 3, the quantile regression results in Table 6 display
a greater variation across percentiles. The regression results presented in Columns (2),(3) and (4)
show that the coefficient on per capita GDP is positive and statistically significant at 1% level for
the bottom 25th percentile and the median. On the other hand, it is negative and statistically signif-
icant for the firms in the 75th percentile. The estimates suggest that although the best performing
firms within the emerging countries can successfully translate higher marginal product of capital
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to higher investment returns, this is not necessarily true for the less-productive firms in the coun-
try. One should also note that the counter-intuitive positive coefficient is steeper for the bottom
25th percentile versus the median. This strengthens the argument by Banerjee and Duflo (2005)
which suggests that the key to Lucas Paradox may not lie so much with ‘international’ factors, but
‘domestic’ factors.
Column (5) presents the results for the post-financial crisis period and reaffirms the divergence
between the marginal product of capital and the investment return patterns observed in column
(1). The coefficient on PCGDP is positive and statistically significant, which implies that the
investment return in developed countries is in fact higher than that in emerging countries during
the sample period. Column (6) repeats the regression in column (5) using only the firms that
adopted IFRS accounting standards during the period, and documents that the cross-country pattern
observed in column (5) is robust to cross-country differences in the accounting standards. Column
(7) also repeats the exercise in column (1) using the MSCI EU countries that share the streamlined
IFRS accounting standard since 2005 and finds that PCGDP is statistically insignificant.
Table 7 shows the results for the following specification to check for any variation in cross-
country IRR patterns across industries:
rc,t,f = α + β1log(PCGDPc,t) + β2Dt + γXc,t,f + c,t,f (1.17)
The results confirm the aggregate pattern observed in Table 6. The coefficient on per capita GDP is
statistically insignificant or positive and significant in 35 out of 44 industries. Only nine industries
have a statistically significant negative coefficient, and the slope is barely significant at the 10%
level in the four among the nine industries. This result contrasts sharply with Table 4, in which 36
industries have a statistically significant negative coefficient. It further confirms the finding that the
cross-country marginal product of capital pattern does not appear to match the investment return
pattern.
Table 8 displays the results of estimating the following regression specification to check for
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annual variation in the cross-country internal rate of return pattern:
rc,i,f = α + β1log(PCGDPc) + β2Fi + γXc,i,f + c,i,f (1.18)
Between 1997 and 2014, the coefficient on PCGDP is statistically insignificant or positively
significant for 10 years. The negatively significant coefficient is observed for eight years, and
four of the eight years occur around the financial crisis (2006-2008, and 2010). The negative
slope is also the steepest during this period (2006 and 2010). The finding again confirms that the
inverse correlation between the marginal product of capital and per capita GDP does not necessarily
translate to an inverse correlation with investment returns as the neoclassical model predicts.
The empirical result in this section documents a divergence between the cross-country invest-
ment return and the marginal product of capital patterns, and show that this finding is surprisingly
robust across different sets of countries and time periods. This result questions the validity of the
traditional approach which uses marginal product of capital to explain the international capital flow
patterns, and further suggests that the standard link between marginal product of capital and the fi-
nancial return does not hold in a sample of developed and emerging countries between 1997-2014.
As this standard link between the two variables stems from the frictionless capital accumulation
equation, this empirical finding highlights the importance of cross-country capital efficiency (i.e.
the level of future capital input that can be obtained from a unit investment today) difference in
explaining the Lucas Paradox.
In the following subsection, I check the effect of cross-country difference in the employment
and taxes, to further confirm the robustness of the result documented thus far.
1.5 Additional Test and Robustness Checks
In this subection, I test the robustness of the findings presented in the previous subsection by
adjusting for the cross-country heterogeneity in hourly labor input and corporate tax rate. I find
that the main result presented in the previous subsection remain unchanged.
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1.5.1 Robustness Check: Hourly labor input
In the previous two subsections, I use per capita GDP as the measure of output per unit labor.
While this is a widely used measure of economic performance22, in this subsection, I check the
robustness of the results using output per hours worked.
Output per hours worked is estimated using the following equation:
PHGDPc,t =
GDPc,t
AHWc,t ∗ Empc,t (1.19)
AHWc,t is the average annual hours worked by person employed, and Empc,t is the employed
population in country c, in time t. PHGDPc,t is a commonly used measure of labor productivity
in the macroeconomics literature23 and is more precise measure of the output per unit labor input
relative to PCGDPc,t, as it measures the labor input by hour. Another commonly used measure of
productivity is GDP per person employed. However, this ratio tend to over-estimate the productiv-
ity of workers in emerging countries as it fails to account for the longer working hours in emerging
countries. Even in 2014, the average annual hours worked by person employed in Thailand was
almost 1.7 times that in Germany. Therefore, ignoring cross-country differences in the average
hours worked can bias the results over-estimating the labor efficiency of the workers in emerging
countries. One drawback of the output per hours worked measure is that China has to be dropped
from the sample due to a lack of data. However, the regression result using the 315,373 firm-years
across 41 countries should still provide a reliable estimate of the cross-country return patterns.
To check the robustness of the results presented in sections 4.1 and 4.2, I use the following
equations, which replace log(PCGDPc,t) with log(PHGDPc,t) :
MPKc,t,i,f = α + β1log(PHGDPc,t) + β2Dt + β3Fi + γXc,t,i,f + c,t,i,f (1.13’)
22see Caselli and Feyrer (2007), Banerjee and Duflo (2005), Gourinchas and Jeanne(2009)
23see Freeman(1988), O’Mahony and Boer (2002), Prescott (2004)
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rc,t,i,f = α + β1log(PHGDPc,t) + β2Dt + β3Fi + γXc,t,i,f + c,t,i,f (1.16’)
Table 9 presents the results. Columns (1)-(4) reports results for the equation (13’), and columns
(5)-(8) report results for equation (16’). The columns (1)-(4) show that the findings about the
marginal product of capital from section 4.1 remain robust. The coefficient on per capita GDP
is negative and significant for the base sample excluding China (Column 1), post-financial crisis
period (Column 2), and in Euro-zone post-2005 (Column 4). The coefficient on per capita GDP
is statistically insignificant for post-financial crisis period IFRS countries (Column 3), which may
be due to the small sample size. Columns (5)-(8) further highlight the findings on internal rates
of return in section 4.2. The coefficient on per capita GDP is positive and significant for the base
sample excluding China (Column 5), post-financial crisis period (Column 6), and post-financial
crisis period IFRS countries (Column 7). Per capita GDP has a statistically insignificant impact on
internal rates of return in Euro-zone countries post-2005 (Column 8).
The empirical results presented in this section confirm the findings of section 4.1 and 4.2, and
questions the validity of the standard approach which use marginal product of capital to explain
the international capital flow.
1.5.2 Robustness Check: Tax adjusted income
In the previous two sections, I use EBITDA as a measure of the capital owner’s earnings to
calibrate firm ROAs and investment returns. Although EBITDA is a consistent with the standard
model, it does not take into account government taxes, which reduce the actual income received
by the capital holders. Therefore, in this section, I check the robustness of the main results using
the following tax-adjusted estimates of MPK and the investment return, following the example of
Fama and French (1999)24:
24I do note that this is not the most accurate measure of the tax-adjustment due to deferred taxes within most firms,
but should nevertheless provide a quick check for the effect of tax. More complete robustness check is beyond the
scope of this paper, but should be conducted in a future work.
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ROAc,t,i,f =
EBITDAc,t,i,f (1−trc,t,i,f )
(MVAc,t−1,i,f )(1+inflc,t)
(1.20)
IRRc,t,i,f =
EBITDAc,t,i,f (1−trc,t,i,f )+[−adj∆Assetc,t,i,f+MVAc,t,i,f−MVAc,t−1,i,f ]
MVAc,t−1,i,f
− inflc,t (1.21)
trc,t,i,f is the income tax rate on firm f , in industry i in time t, in country c. An alternative
expression for tax-adjusted income is EBITDAc,t,i,f − Taxc,t,i,f , where Taxc,t,i,f is the actual
income tax on firm f . However, EBITDAc,t,i,f (1− trc,t,i,f ) should provide a tax-adjusted income
estimate that is more consistent with the model, as the amount of tax imposed on the firm is
based on the income after deduction of interest income and expense. Therefore, EBITDAc,t,i,f −
Taxc,t,i,f , where Taxc,t,i,f is the actual income tax on firm f , and should lead to large variation
on the post-tax income based on the capital structure of the specific firm. On the other hand, the
estimate based on the tax rate is less affected by the capital structure of the firm, reducing potential
bias from the capital structure differences across the firms.
The tax-adjusted measures of ROA and IRR reduce the size of the sample, as they exclude
firm-years without tax-rate data. Therefore, the cross-country pattern is estimated using 211,407
firm-years across 42 countries, rather than 315,373 firm-years. Table 10 presrnts the empirical
results from equations (13) and (16), using the tax-adjusted ROA and IRR. Columns (1)-(4) re-
port the results from the equation (13), and columns (5)-(8) report the results from the equation
(16). Columns (1)-(4) confirm the original finding that log(PCGDPc,t) and the marginal product
of capital are inversely correlated. The coefficient for log(PCGDPc,t) is significantly negative in
the base sample (Column 1), post-financial crisis period (Column 2), IFRS countries post financial
period (Column 3), and Euro-zone countries post 2006 (Column 4). On the other hand, column
(5) shows that the log(PCGDPc,t) is a positive and significant predictor of IRR in the base sam-
ple. These findings corroborate the evidence about the the differences between the cross-country
marginal product of capital patterns and the investment return patterns observed in sections 4.1 and
4.2. These differences are also observed in columns (6) and (7), which document positively signif-
icant coefficient for log(PCGDPc,t) in post-financial crisis period, IFRS countries post-financial
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crisis period. log(PCGDPc,t) is statistically insignificant in Euro-zone countries post-2006.
These finding shows that the empirical result documented in sections 4.1 and 4.2 are extremely
robust across different specifications and samples. There seems to be a non-negligible gap between
the cross-country marginal product of capital pattern and the investment return pattern, which
suggests that the question ”why the capital doesn’t flow to emerging countries?” is intricately tied
to this gap between the two variables. Based on this finding, in the following section I propose a
modification to the traditional neoclassical model, which can potentially model the gap between
marginal product of capital and investment return documented in this section. I also investigate
alternative macroeconomic variables often used in the Lucas Paradox literature, to find the factors
that can potentially affect the size of the observed gap between the marginal product of capital and
the investment return.
1.6 Conclusion
According to the textbook neoclassical theory, if two countries share the identical production
function, and the trade in capital good is free and competitive, new investment will only occur in
the poorer country since the marginal return to capital should be higher in economies with less
capital (due to the law of diminishing return). However, as Lucas pointed out in his seminal paper
in 1990, observed capital flow from developed to developing countries fall short of what should be
observed according to the theory. This phenomena has been named ”Lucas Paradox” and has been
one of the major puzzles in the macroeconomic literature.
In this paper, I show using the firm-level data that despite the higher marginal product of capi-
tal in emerging countries, financial return are equalized across developed and emerging countries.
This finding is significant as it questions the validity of using marginal product of capital in ex-
plaining the international capital flow. The empirical result suggest that marginal product of capital
trend does not mirror the investment return trend due to the cross-country difference in the cap-
ital efficiency, i.e., the level of future capital input that can be obtained from a unit investment
today. The effect of the capital adjustment cost can be sufficiently large that it can divorce the
cross-country financial return pattern from the marginal product of capital pattern. Therefore, the
answer to ”Lucas Paradox” may simply be that the investment return is equalized across countries,
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despite the international difference in marginal product of capital. This finding also suggests that
the key issues in explaining the international capital flow is not an ”international” credit frictions
but rather a ”domestic” credit frictions which affects the capital accumulation process. Thus, the
future research on Lucas Paradox should focus not only on factors that affect productive efficiency,
but also those that affect the capital efficiency.
This paper differs methodologically from most others in the literature in that it uses the firm
level data instead of an aggregate data to explain the cross country differences in return and
marginal product of capital. The firm level data has an advantage over macroeconomic data in
that it allows direct computation of marginal product of capital and the financial return. This al-
lows one to test the validity of the firm first order condition that is at the heart of the Lucas Paradox.
Despite this major benefits of the firm-level data, it also has some major drawbacks. It restricts
the analysis to mid-to large-size firms that are listed in the stock market. One may argue that the
return found using only the firm level data is biased upward as it doesn’t include self-employed
workers, or mom-and-pop stores. This is a plausible argument, and the future research, based on a
larger dataset that encompasses both the unlisted firms and the self-employed workers should help
increase the understanding of the capital market frictions.
29
Table 1.1: Data Summary Statistics (1997-2014)
The sample includes all non-financial (all SIC codes except 6000∼6999) balance sheet solvent firm-years in the Worldscope database with 1)
market value(WC08001), assets(WC02999), liabilities(WC03351), depreciation(WC01151), EBITDA(WC18198), extraordinary credit(WC01253)
and extraordinary charge(WC01254) data for the year and; 2) debt and market value data for the previous year in the MSCI developed and
emerging countries (excluding Saudi Arabia, Qatar and UAE) between 1997 and 2014. Purchasing Power Parity (PPP) adjusted per capita GDP
(PCGDP) is calibrated using the PPP adjusted GDP(rgdpo) and the population (pop) estimate from the Penn World Table 9.0. Employed
population (emp), and average hours worked per employed (avh) are also from the Penn World Table 9.0. CPI inflation is from the World Bank
Country wbcode Firm-years
Fama French
Industries
PPP adjusted
PCGDP (2014)
CPI Inflation
(2014)
Population
(2014, millions)
Employed
(2014, millions)
Average Hours
Worked per Employed
(2014)
Australia AUS 14,838 44 44,241 0.025 23.6 12.0 1,803
Austria AUT 1,147 28 45,705 0.016 8.5 4.4 1,629
Brazil BRA 1,450 35 14,811 0.063 206.1 105.9 1,711
Belgium BEL 3,250 38 39,950 0.003 11.2 4.9 1,575
Canada CAN 12,632 44 43,368 0.019 35.6 18.8 1,688
Chile CHL 2,080 30 21,317 0.044 17.8 7.8 1,990
China CHN 20,092 44 12,513 0.020 1,369.4 798.4 NA
Colombia COL 365 24 12,858 0.029 47.8 24.6 1,772
Czech Republic CZE 436 24 29,187 0.003 10.5 5.1 1,771
Denmark DNK 1,890 37 44,423 0.006 5.6 2.8 1,438
Finland FIN 1,929 36 38,343 0.010 5.5 2.6 1,643
France FRA 8,637 43 38,584 0.005 66.1 27.3 1,473
Germany DEU 9,037 43 46,507 0.009 80.6 42.5 1,371
Greece GRC 3,643 37 24,685 -0.013 11.0 4.0 2,042
Hong Kong HKG 11,342 42 45,134 0.044 7.2 3.7 2,234
Hungary HUN 423 23 22,750 -0.002 9.9 4.2 1,860
India IND 17,621 44 5,452 0.064 1,295.3 510.3 2,162
Indonesia IDN 3,826 37 9,798 0.064 254.5 113.0 2,027
Ireland IRL 782 26 51,927 0.002 4.7 1.9 1,821
Israel ISR 3,187 40 31,606 0.005 7.9 3.9 1,880
Italy ITA 3,141 36 35,324 0.002 59.8 23.6 1,734
Japan JPN 52,501 44 35,566 0.027 126.8 65.0 1,729
Malaysia MYS 11,427 42 21,650 0.031 29.9 13.8 2,268
Mexico MEX 1,470 35 15,520 0.040 125.4 51.4 2,137
Netherlands NLD 2,120 39 48,178 0.010 16.9 8.7 1,420
New Zealand NZL 1,385 36 34,066 0.009 4.5 2.4 1,762
Norway NOR 2,260 33 78,293 0.020 5.1 2.7 1,427
Peru PER 986 26 10,931 0.032 31.0 14.7 1,790
Philippines PHL 1,706 33 6,638 0.041 99.1 34.9 2,115
Poland POL 3,053 40 24,450 0.001 38.6 15.8 2,039
Portugal PRT 812 30 27,047 -0.003 10.4 4.3 1,857
Russia RUS 1,869 35 24,056 0.078 143.4 71.9 1,985
Singapore SGP 7,146 43 66,482 0.010 5.5 3.4 2,263
South Africa ZAF 3,621 41 12,067 0.064 54.0 18.3 2,215
South Korea KOR 16,906 43 34,955 0.013 50.1 26.1 2,124
Spain ESP 1,883 36 32,858 -0.001 46.3 17.6 1,689
Sweden SWE 4,761 42 42,605 -0.002 9.7 4.8 1,609
Switzerland CHE 2,936 34 62,637 0.000 8.2 5.0 1,568
Thailand THA 5,740 41 13,725 0.019 67.7 38.9 2,284
Turkey TUR 2,907 36 19,675 0.089 77.5 24.6 1,832
United Kingdom GBR 18,827 44 38,757 0.015 64.3 31.0 1,675
United States USA 69,400 44 51,959 0.016 319.4 148.5 1,765
Total 335,464 44
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Table 1.2: Summary Statistics: ROA vs. IRR (1997-2014)
ROAc,t,i,f =
EBITDAc,t,i,f
(PVc,t1,i,f )(1 + inflc,t)
IRRc,t,i,f =
EBITDAc,t,i,f + [−Adj∆Assetc,t,i,f + PVc,t,i,f − PVc,t−1,i,f ]
PVc,t−1,i,f
− inflc,t
ROAc,t,i,f is the ratio between the firm EBITDA before extraordinary items (sum of EBITDA after extraordinary items (WC18198) and
extraordinary cost (WC01254) minus extraordinary credit(WC01253)) and the market value of asset (sum of market value of equity(WC08001)and
the book value of liabilities(WC03351)) from the previous year adjusted for CPI inflation. IRRc,t,i,f is the ratio between the sum of EBITDA
before extraordinary item, change in the market value of asset less the change in the book value of asset and the market value of asset from the
previous year adjusted for CPI inflation
ROA IRR
Mean Median SD Mean Median SD
Australia AUS -0.001 0.020 0.183 0.184 0.007 0.920
Austria AUT 0.098 0.098 0.069 0.065 0.042 0.275
Brazil BRA 0.093 0.097 0.072 0.060 0.042 0.278
Belgium BEL 0.139 0.124 0.108 0.102 0.052 0.354
Canada CAN 0.065 0.084 0.139 0.132 0.037 0.626
Chile CHL 0.107 0.099 0.085 0.062 0.025 0.303
China CHN 0.062 0.052 0.061 0.146 0.011 0.577
Colombia COL 0.132 0.119 0.093 0.062 0.007 0.365
Czech Republic CZE 0.145 0.134 0.098 0.040 0.021 0.254
Denmark DNK 0.085 0.092 0.087 0.071 0.032 0.342
Finland FIN 0.094 0.097 0.070 0.088 0.061 0.313
France FRA 0.087 0.087 0.076 0.067 0.042 0.303
Germany DEU 0.080 0.088 0.095 0.063 0.040 0.345
Greece GRC 0.072 0.069 0.075 0.120 -0.015 0.823
Hong Kong HKG 0.063 0.064 0.118 0.150 0.011 0.749
Hungary HUN 0.104 0.109 0.094 0.002 -0.025 0.333
India IND 0.113 0.104 0.087 0.058 -0.029 0.459
Indonesia IDN 0.111 0.099 0.105 0.072 -0.019 0.489
Ireland IRL 0.075 0.084 0.079 0.137 0.065 0.551
Israel ISR 0.069 0.076 0.102 0.083 0.034 0.424
Italy ITA 0.079 0.082 0.064 0.030 0.020 0.229
Japan JPN 0.081 0.077 0.059 0.055 0.027 0.244
Malaysia MYS 0.090 0.088 0.085 0.044 0.015 0.317
Mexico MEX 0.107 0.102 0.071 0.066 0.040 0.292
Netherlands NLD 0.095 0.097 0.063 0.084 0.063 0.305
New Zealand NZL 0.087 0.100 0.100 0.082 0.060 0.330
Norway NOR 0.075 0.086 0.108 0.087 0.039 0.454
Peru PER 0.155 0.137 0.127 0.157 0.074 0.510
Philippines PHL 0.095 0.089 0.101 0.110 0.022 0.527
Poland POL 0.085 0.084 0.094 0.073 0.011 0.473
Portugal PRT 0.090 0.086 0.063 0.037 0.018 0.194
Russia RUS 0.148 0.123 0.137 0.040 -0.014 0.476
Singapore SGP 0.085 0.082 0.090 0.068 0.013 0.407
South Africa ZAF 0.126 0.123 0.118 0.105 0.058 0.422
South Korea KOR 0.091 0.093 0.113 0.068 0.018 0.391
Spain ESP 0.090 0.087 0.062 0.077 0.049 0.268
Sweden SWE 0.040 0.072 0.130 0.092 0.037 0.500
Switzerland CHE 0.084 0.087 0.064 0.096 0.070 0.302
Thailand THA 0.116 0.109 0.095 0.125 0.055 0.386
Turkey TUR 0.108 0.091 0.106 0.016 -0.047 0.566
United Kingdom GBR 0.066 0.086 0.106 0.085 0.037 0.490
United States USA 0.063 0.081 0.111 0.110 0.048 0.534
Total 0.076 0.082 0.105 0.092 0.028 0.493
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Table 1.3: MSCI Developed and Emerging Countries: Firm ROA and PCGDP
Purchasing Power Parity (PPP) adjusted per capita GDP (PCGDP) is calibrated using the PPP adjusted GDP(rgdpo) and the population (pop)
estimate from the Penn World Table 9.0. Size is the inflation adjusted book value of the firm’s asset in US dollar, and leverage is the ratio between
the book value of liability and the assets. Price-to-Book measures the ratio between the market and the book value of the firm equity. Time
dummies and industry dummies for the 48 Fama-French Industries are included in all regressions. Standard deviation is reported in the parenthesis.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Variables ROA ROA ROA ROA ROA ROA ROA
Years 97-14 97-14 (25th) 97-14 (50th) 97-14 (75th) 11-14 11-14 (IFRS) 06-14 (EU)
log(PCGDP) -0.0197*** -0.00897*** -0.00808*** -0.0140*** -0.0165*** -0.00968** -0.00936**
(0.00193) (0.000250) (0.000207) (0.000248) (0.00369) (0.00379) (0.00451)
log(size) 0.00990*** 0.00960*** 0.00604*** 0.00308*** 0.00855*** 0.00906*** 0.0139***
(0.000796) (7.11e-05) (5.87e-05) (7.03e-05) (0.00172) (0.00185) (0.000601)
Leverage -0.0338*** -0.0131*** -0.0294*** -0.0615*** -0.0333*** -0.0104 -0.0259***
(0.00367) (0.000808) (0.000667) (0.000799) (0.00635) (0.00878) (0.00595)
Price-to-Book -2.04e-05** -0.000304*** -0.000122*** -2.25e-05*** -2.31e-05* -7.71e-05*** -5.56e-05***
(8.19e-06) (2.45e-06) (2.02e-06) (2.42e-06) (1.35e-05) (2.93e-05) (1.92e-05)
Constant 0.189*** 0.0347*** 0.119*** 0.272*** 0.166*** 0.0597 0.0545
(0.0227) (0.00438) (0.00361) (0.00432) (0.0411) (0.0469) (0.0466)
Observations 334,608 334,608 334,608 334,608 88,527 44,640 34,031
R-squared 0.127 0.119 0.136 0.116
Time Dummies Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Industry Dummies Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p< 0.01, ** p< 0.05, * p< 0.1
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Table 1.4: Non-Financial 48 Fama French Industries: Firm ROA and PCGDP
Purchasing Power Parity (PPP) adjusted per capita GDP (PCGDP) is calibrated using the PPP adjusted real GDP(rgdpo) and the population (pop)
estimate from the Penn World Table 9.0. Size is the inflation adjusted book value of the firm’s asset in US dollar, and leverage is the ratio between
the book value of liability and the assets. Price-to-Book measures the ratio between the market and the book value of the firm equity. Time
dummies are included in the regression but are not reported. Financial industries are excluded from the list of 48 Fama-French Industries, leaving
44 industries for the analysis.
Industries log(PCGDP) log(size) Leverage Price-to-Book Observations R-squared
Agriculture -0.0320*** 0.0165** -0.123** -0.000202 4,145 0.024
Food Products -0.128 2.63e-05 0.0168 -0.000608 9,753 0.003
Candy & Soda -0.0177*** 0.00895*** -0.0325 -0.000240** 2,141 0.062
Beer & Liquor -0.0361** 0.00540*** -0.0766 -0.000840 2,775 0.017
Tobacco Products -0.0191 0.00472** -0.00236 -0.000991 481 0.040
Recreation 0.00377 0.00421*** -0.0705*** -0.000108** 2,990 0.009
Entertainment -0.0169** 0.0117*** 0.0102 -0.000122 5,187 0.012
Printing and Publishing -0.0104*** 0.00784*** -0.0542*** -0.000464*** 3,758 0.054
Consumer Goods -0.0200*** 0.00743*** -0.0799*** -0.00112** 7,320 0.014
Apparel -0.0144*** 0.00351** -0.123*** 0.000103 4,111 0.024
Healthcare -0.0177*** 0.00964*** 0.0735 -0.00172** 3,156 0.015
Medical Equipment -0.0764*** 0.0480** 0.0641 -9.29e-05*** 5,607 0.004
Pharmaceutical Products -0.0601*** 0.0217*** -0.0437*** -1.89e-05 10,932 0.158
Chemicals -0.0361** 0.00742*** -0.0455 -5.67e-05 12,415 0.004
Rubber and Plastic Products -0.0198*** 0.00455*** -0.0891*** -0.000526** 3,569 0.065
Textiles -0.0248*** 0.00310*** -0.0740*** -0.00390*** 5,260 0.112
Construction Materials -0.0144*** 0.00577*** -0.0906*** -0.000377*** 13,180 0.065
Construction -0.00404*** 0.00357*** -0.0634*** -3.39e-05 17,807 0.020
Steel Works -0.0156*** 0.00482*** -0.0965*** -0.000582*** 10,231 0.082
Fabricated Products -0.0118*** 0.00517*** -0.0939*** -0.00526*** 1,530 0.119
Machinery -0.0168*** 0.00573*** -0.0553*** -0.000873* 14,795 0.055
Electrical Equipment -0.0148*** 0.00720*** -0.0453*** -0.000988* 5,427 0.054
Automobiles -0.0196*** 0.00631*** -0.0714*** -0.000180*** 8,991 0.044
Aircraft 0.0161*** 0.000331 -0.00602 -0.000183 1,190 0.056
Shipbuilding, Railroad
Equipment -0.00827 -0.00108 -0.0125 -0.00900 867 0.027
Defense -0.0768*** 0.00725* -0.0991*** -0.00519* 343 0.136
Precious Metals -0.0167*** 0.0396*** -0.0139 3.52e-05*** 5,036 0.127
Non-Metallic and Industrial
Mining -0.0527*** 0.0344*** -0.0491 -0.000104* 5,854 0.141
Coal -0.0377*** 0.0268*** 0.0158 -9.83e-07 1,902 0.145
Petroleum and Natural Gas -0.00235 0.0206*** -0.00271 -0.000313 11,788 0.099
Utilities -0.0197*** 0.0126*** -0.0513*** -1.33e-05 9,876 0.006
Communication -0.0262*** 0.0185*** -0.0335** -1.13e-05 9,327 0.011
Personal Services -0.0201*** 0.0122*** 0.000667 -0.000788** 3,388 0.062
Business Services 0.026 0.0190*** 0.0582* -1.35e-05 36,745 0.001
Computers -0.0231*** 0.00925*** -0.0316*** -9.05e-05 8,793 0.053
Electronic Equipment -0.0141*** 0.0106*** -0.0317*** -4.73e-05 15,818 0.028
Measuring and Control
Equipment -0.00854** 0.00985*** -0.0444*** -0.000184* 4,437 0.049
Business Supplies -0.0177*** 0.00354*** -0.103*** -1.83e-05*** 5,242 0.105
Shipping Containers -0.00553* 0.00457*** -0.0791*** -0.000361 1,665 0.091
Transportation -0.0199 0.00622*** -0.0176 -7.78e-07 12,407 0.003
Wholesale -0.0144*** 0.00779*** -0.0595** -2.48e-05 17,709 0.004
Retail -0.00362** 0.00755*** -0.0720*** -4.16e-05 17,315 0.006
Restaurants, Hotels -0.0141** 0.000117 -0.0378** -1.87e-05 7,931 0.005
Other -0.0043 0.0159*** -0.0311* -0.000246* 1,365 0.109
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p< 0.01, ** p< 0.05, * p< 0.1
33
Table 1.5: Annual Analysis: Firm ROA and PCGDP
Purchasing Power Parity (PPP) adjusted per capita GDP (PCGDP) is calibrated using the PPP adjusted GDP(rgdpo) and the population (pop)
estimate from the Penn World Table 9.0. Size is the inflation adjusted book value of the firm’s asset in US dollar, and leverage is the ratio between
the book value of liability and the assets. Price-to-Book measures the ratio between the market and the book value of the firm equity. Industry
dummies are included in the regression but are not reported.
log(PCGDP) log(size) Leverage Price-to-Book
1997 -0.00813*** 0.00500*** -0.0380*** -1.26e-05*
1998 -0.0102*** 0.00703*** -0.0375*** -9.80e-05***
1999 -0.0235*** 0.00953*** -0.0517*** -3.00e-05**
2000 -0.0157*** 0.00960*** -0.0331*** -6.91e-05
2001 -0.0217*** 0.0113*** -0.0350*** -0.000256***
2002 -0.0283*** 0.0124*** -0.0387*** -6.44e-06
2003 -0.0169*** 0.0128*** -0.0426*** -2.68e-05
2004 -0.0157*** 0.0115*** -0.0410*** -1.54e-06
2005 -0.0147*** 0.0120*** -0.0340*** -0.000266***
2006 -0.0177*** 0.0103*** -0.0159*** -4.59e-05
2007 -0.0235*** 0.00976*** -0.0197*** -3.22e-05
2008 -0.0196*** 0.00776*** -0.0239*** -2.72e-05**
2009 -0.0257*** 0.0129*** -0.0639*** -0.000767***
2010 -0.0273*** 0.00968*** -0.0222* -0.000142***
2011 -0.0160*** 0.00872*** -0.0273*** -2.74e-05**
2012 -0.0158*** 0.00909*** -0.0384*** -4.93e-05***
2013 -0.0155*** 0.00833*** -0.0407*** -1.01e-05
2014 -0.0189*** 0.00801*** -0.0251*** -7.43e-05*
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p< 0.01, ** p< 0.05, * p< 0.1
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Table 1.6: MSCI Developed and Emerging Countries: Firm Investment Return and PCGDP
Purchasing Power Parity (PPP) adjusted per capita GDP (PCGDP) is calibrated using the PPP adjusted GDP(rgdpo) and the population (pop)
estimate from the Penn World Table 9.0. Size is the inflation adjusted book value of the firm’s asset in US dollar, and leverage is the ratio between
the book value of liability and the assets. Price-to-Book measures the ratio between the market and the book value of the firm equity. Time
dummies and industry dummies for the 48 Fama-French Industries are included in all regressions. Standard deviation is reported in the parenthesis.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Variables IRR IRR IRR IRR IRR IRR IRR
Years 97-14 97-14 (25th) 97-14 (50th) 97-14 (75th) 11-14 11-14 (IFRS) 06-14 (EU)
log(PCGDP) -0.00209 0.0287*** 0.0150*** -0.0144*** 0.0303 0.0163 -0.00116
(0.0181) (0.000858) (0.000769) (0.00147) (0.0206) (0.0405) (0.0415)
log(size) 0.000712 0.0123*** 0.00633*** -1.55e-05 1.45e-05 -0.00146 0.0117***
(0.00213) (0.000243) (0.000218) (0.000418) (0.00263) (0.00334) (0.00221)
Leverage -0.121*** 0.141*** -0.0333*** -0.279*** -0.0897*** -0.106** -0.0882***
(0.0187) (0.00277) (0.00248) (0.00476) (0.0306) (0.0492) (0.0214)
Price-to-Book 0.000212** 1.65e-05** 0.000490*** 0.0209*** 0.000103 0.000470** 0.000266***
(8.39e-05) (8.38e-06) (7.51e-06) (1.44e-05) (8.64e-05) (0.000194) (6.86e-05)
Constant 0.154 -0.652*** -0.187*** 0.466*** -0.271 -0.0906 0.0694
(0.192) (0.0150) (0.0134) (0.0258) (0.215) (0.468) (0.453)
Observations 334,608 334,608 334,608 334,608 88,527 44,640 34,031
R-squared 0.064 0.037 0.036 0.142
Time Dummies Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Industry Dummies Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p< 0.01, ** p< 0.05, * p< 0.1
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Table 1.7: Non-Financial 48 Fama French Industries: Firm IRR and PCGDP
Purchasing Power Parity (PPP) adjusted per capita GDP (PCGDP) is calibrated using the PPP adjusted GDP(rgdpo) and the population (pop)
estimate from the Penn World Table 9.0. Size is the inflation adjusted book value of the firm’s asset in US dollar, and leverage is the ratio between
the book value of liability and the assets. Price-to-Book measures the ratio between the market and the book value of the firm equity. Time
dummies are included in the regression, but not reported. Financial industries are excluded from the list of 48 Fama-French Industries, leaving 44
industries for the analysis.
Industries log(PCGDP) log(size) Leverage Price-to-Book Observations R-squared
Agriculture -0.0172** 0.0110*** -0.104*** 0.00124 4,145 0.093
Food Products -0.00415 0.00250* -0.157*** 0.00190 9,753 0.064
Candy & Soda -0.0113 -0.00434 -0.0610 -0.000295 2,141 0.092
Beer & Liquor -0.0375*** 0.00625** -0.198*** 0.0204*** 2,775 0.142
Tobacco Products -0.0383 0.0120 -0.00228 0.00355** 481 0.107
Recreation 0.0187 -0.00318 -0.156*** 7.76e-05 2,990 0.063
Entertainment 0.000105 0.00265 -0.118*** 0.000719 5,187 0.042
Printing and Publishing 0.00829 0.00190 -0.133*** 0.000987 3,758 0.096
Consumer Goods -0.0121* 0.00728*** -0.198*** 0.00806** 7,320 0.093
Apparel 0.0152 0.000410 -0.201*** 0.00820*** 4,111 0.108
Healthcare -0.00092 0.00866* -0.188*** 0.00849*** 3,156 0.078
Medical Equipment -0.0288 0.00995*** -0.148*** 0.000340*** 5,607 0.102
Pharmaceutical Products -0.0183*** 0.00686*** -0.158*** 0.000364 10,932 0.090
Chemicals -0.00826* 0.00394*** -0.101*** 0.000133 12,415 0.083
Rubber and Plastic Products 0.0113 0.00130 -0.155*** 0.00267 3,569 0.091
Textiles 0.0167*** -0.000736 -0.0999*** 0.00474* 5,260 0.071
Construction Materials 0.000967 0.00342*** -0.120*** 0.00760*** 13,180 0.115
Construction -0.00254 -0.00524*** -0.0769*** 0.000518* 17,807 0.088
Steel Works 0.00177 0.000873 -0.103*** 0.00627*** 10,231 0.120
Fabricated Products -0.0291** 0.00653*** -0.272*** 0.0469*** 1,530 0.207
Machinery -0.0181*** 0.00299** -0.0989*** 0.00555** 14,795 0.124
Electrical Equipment -0.0155* 0.00469** -0.118*** 0.00378 5,427 0.095
Automobiles -0.00718 0.000143 -0.105*** 0.000566** 8,991 0.101
Aircraft -0.0233 -0.0135*** -0.0547 0.000528 1,190 0.164
Shipbuilding, Railroad
Equipment 0.0372** 0.00419 -0.353*** 0.0654*** 867 0.324
Defense -0.106* 0.0126 -0.295*** 0.0593*** 343 0.211
Precious Metals -0.0251 0.00246 -0.156*** 0.000288*** 5,036 0.120
Non-Metallic and Industrial
Mining -0.0035 0.00546 -0.330*** 0.000881 5,854 0.120
Coal -0.027 -0.00552 -0.247*** -1.39e-05 1,902 0.110
Petroleum and Natural Gas 0.0105 0.00151 -0.287*** 0.00331*** 11,788 0.109
Utilities 0.00869 -0.00358* -0.0825*** 0.000178 9,876 0.081
Communication 0.0150** -0.00246 -0.0697** 6.88e-05** 9,327 0.128
Personal Services 0.00207 0.000821 -0.145*** 0.0106** 3,388 0.079
Business Services -0.00194 0.00488*** -0.0987*** 7.51e-05 36,745 0.080
Computers -0.00299 0.000476 -0.129*** 0.00163*** 8,793 0.114
Electronic Equipment 0.0103 -0.00122 -0.161*** 0.000327 15,818 0.136
Measuring and Control
Equipment 0.0122 0.00151 -0.0977*** 0.000724 4,437 0.118
Business Supplies 0.0058 0.000816 -0.128*** 0.000473*** 5,242 0.121
Shipping Containers 0.0247** 0.00307 -0.0878* 0.00512 1,665 0.106
Transportation 0.002 -0.000145 -0.126*** 0.000244*** 12,407 0.091
Wholesale -0.00206 0.000249 -0.108*** 0.000234 17,709 0.051
Retail -0.00134 0.00306** -0.126*** 0.00107** 17,315 0.066
Restaurants, Hotels 0.0210*** -0.00471* -0.0839*** 0.000387* 7,931 0.069
Other -0.0194 0.000250 -0.169** 0.000494** 1,365 0.094
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p< 0.01, ** p< 0.05, * p< 0.1
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Table 1.8: Annual Analysis: Firm IRR and PCGDP
Purchasing Power Parity (PPP) adjusted per capita GDP (PCGDP) is calibrated using the PPP adjusted GDP(rgdpo) and the population (pop)
estimate from the Penn World Table 9.0. Size is the inflation adjusted book value of the firm’s asset in US dollar, and leverage is the ratio between
the book value of liability and the assets. Price-to-Book measures the ratio between the market and the book value of the firm equity. Industry
dummies are included in the regression but are not reported.
log(PCGDP) log(size) Leverage Price-to-Book
1997 0.0786*** -0.00267 -0.0655*** 8.87e-05*
1998 0.0553*** 0.0118*** 0.0258 0.00171***
1999 -0.0431*** -0.0202*** -0.442*** 0.000586***
2000 -0.0239*** 0.00242 -0.0526** 0.000447
2001 0.0223*** 0.0154*** -0.0334** 0.00101***
2002 -0.0194*** 0.00202 0.0131 0.000163*
2003 0.0840*** -0.00765*** -0.308*** 0.000238
2004 0.0494*** -0.0164*** -0.202*** 2.64e-05
2005 0.00699 0.0225*** -0.129*** 0.000885
2006 -0.0764*** -0.00294** -0.144*** 0.000880***
2007 -0.108*** 0.00313* -0.269*** 0.000539**
2008 -0.0244*** -0.00520*** 0.156*** 5.30e-05
2009 0.00671 0.0273*** -0.334*** 0.00956***
2010 -0.0658*** -0.0106*** -0.136** 0.00119**
2011 0.0496*** -0.00447*** 0.000452 9.99e-05
2012 0.0234*** 0.0111*** -0.0470*** 0.000270***
2013 0.0856*** -0.00529*** -0.140*** 3.27e-05
2014 -0.0441*** -0.000912 -0.171*** 0.000502
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p< 0.01, ** p< 0.05, * p< 0.1
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Table 1.9: Robustness Check: log(PHGDP) vs. ROA and IRR
Purchasing Power Parity (PPP) adjusted per hour GDP (PHGDP) is calibrated using the PPP adjusted GDP(rgdpo), employment (emp) and the
average hours worked (avh) estimate from the Penn World Table 9.0. Size is the inflation adjusted book value of the firm’s asset in US dollar, and
leverage is the ratio between the book value of liability and the assets. Price-to-Book measures the ratio between the market and the book value of
the firm equity. Time dummies and industry dummies for the 48 Fama-French Industries are included in all regressions. Standard deviation is
reported in the parenthesis.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
ROA ROA ROA ROA IRR IRR IRR IRR
97-14 11-14 11-14 (IFRS) 06-14 (EU) 97-14 11-14 11-14 (IFRS) 06-14 (EU)
log(PHGDP) -0.0225*** -0.0192*** -0.00116 -0.00460** 0.00405*** 0.0320*** 0.0256*** -0.00713
(0.000256) (0.000479) (0.00133) (0.00189) (0.00122) (0.00199) (0.00560) (0.00808)
log(size) 0.00951*** 0.00827*** 0.00876*** 0.0137*** 0.000703** 0.000599 -0.000498 0.0117***
(8.54e-05) (0.000152) (0.000206) (0.000268) (0.000352) (0.000553) (0.000771) (0.000935)
Leverage -0.0313*** -0.0330*** -0.00667** -0.0223*** -0.121*** -0.0969*** -0.121*** -0.0865***
(0.00184) (0.00191) (0.00332) (0.00322) (0.00770) (0.00755) (0.0129) (0.0108)
Price-to-Book -1.97e-05** -2.11e-05* -7.50e-05** -5.69e-05*** 0.000198** 8.93e-05 0.000420*** 0.000265***
(7.95e-06) (1.25e-05) (3.01e-05) (1.98e-05) (8.07e-05) (7.75e-05) (0.000160) (6.86e-05)
Constant 0.0686*** 0.0697*** -0.0336* -0.0269* 0.121*** -0.0430 0.0804 0.0802*
(0.00357) (0.00689) (0.0185) (0.0148) (0.0161) (0.0322) (0.101) (0.0474)
Observations 315,373 80,077 35,935 32,130 315,373 80,077 35,935 32,130
R-squared 0.132 0.126 0.140 0.119 0.059 0.028 0.019 0.141
Time Dummies Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Industry Dummies Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p< 0.01, ** p< 0.05, * p< 0.1
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Table 1.10: Robustness Check: Tax Adjustment
Purchasing Power Parity (PPP) adjusted per capita GDP (PCGDP) is calibrated using the PPP adjusted GDP(rgdpo) and the population (pop)
estimate from the Penn World Table 9.0. Size is the inflation adjusted book value of the firm’s asset in US dollar, and leverage is the ratio between
the book value of liability and the assets. Price-to-Book measures the ratio between the market and the book value of the firm equity. Time
dummies and industry dummies for the 48 Fama-French Industries are included in all regressions. Standard deviation is reported in the parenthesis.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
ROA ROA ROA ROA IRR IRR IRR IRR
97-14 11-14 11-14 (IFRS) 06-14 (EU) 97-14 11-14 11-14 (IFRS) 06-14 (EU)
log(PCGDP) -0.0129*** -0.00667*** -0.00262** -0.00388** 0.00252* 0.0322*** 0.0119* -0.0174
(0.000211) (0.000381) (0.00103) (0.00196) (0.00144) (0.00226) (0.00617) (0.0114)
log(size) 0.000452*** -0.000223** -0.000437*** -0.000628*** -0.00387*** -0.00292*** -0.00335*** -0.000911
(6.00e-05) (0.000105) (0.000144) (0.000199) (0.000348) (0.000562) (0.000923) (0.00103)
Leverage -0.0503*** -0.0506*** -0.0525*** -0.0401*** -0.115*** -0.101*** -0.123*** -0.101***
(0.000736) (0.00142) (0.00264) (0.00266) (0.00472) (0.00870) (0.0172) (0.0131)
Price-to-Book -8.42e-05*** -0.000251*** -0.000391* -1.81e-05 0.00198*** 0.00585*** 0.00992** 0.000703
(2.94e-05) (9.05e-05) (0.000220) (2.52e-05) (0.000542) (0.00183) (0.00498) (0.000568)
Constant 0.226*** 0.176*** 0.124*** 0.154*** 0.138*** -0.267*** -0.0476 0.396***
(0.00319) (0.00609) (0.0152) (0.0223) (0.0203) (0.0304) (0.0879) (0.127)
Observations 211,407 54,075 21,260 20,556 211,407 54,075 21,260 20,556
R-squared 0.088 0.071 0.062 0.045 0.081 0.071 0.079 0.185
Time Dummies Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Industry Dummies Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p< 0.01, ** p< 0.05, * p< 0.1
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Figure 1.1: ROA and IRR distribution plot
(a) ROA distribution
(b) IRR distribution
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Figure 1.2: ROA and IRR scatter plot
(a) median ROA and mean log(PCGDP) two-way plot
(b) median IRR and mean log(PCGDP) two-way plot
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CHAPTER 2
THE LUCAS PARADOX AND THE CAPITAL ACCUMULATION IN CAPITAL-SCARCE
COUNTRIES
2.1 Introduction
In his seminal paper in 1990, Lucas brings into spotlight the lack of capital flow from US to
India despite the large difference in marginal product of capital between the two countries. This
seminal paper by Lucas led to an extensive literature on international capital market friction and
productive efficiency differences across developed and emerging market countries. However, the
empirical patterns in the previous chapters show that while there exists a statistically significant
inverse relationship between per capita GDP and the marginal product of capital, no such relation-
ship exists between per capita GDP and investment returns. This finding suggests that differences
in the marginal product of capital across countries do not necessarily translate into corresponding
differences in investment returns and the standard link assumed between productivity and invest-
ment returns appears not to hold.
This has a major implication for extensive literature on Lucas Paradox, which has been one
of the major puzzles in the macroeconomics, as the finding suggest that key issues in explaining
the lack of capital flow may be the domestic factors that affect the capital accumulation process.
Therefore, in this chapter, I further expand the findings of the previous chapter and investigate cap-
ital accumulation path and macroeconomic factors that affect this process within an economy using
the firm-level market and accounting data from MSCI developed and emerging market countries.
The key equation that dictates the relationship between the marginal product of capital and
the investment return is the capital accumulation formula. The standard model assumes a costless
adjustment of the capital stock, where a unit increase in investment leads to a unit increase in cap-
ital stock. This relationship implies that the investment return differs from the marginal product
of capital only by the constant depreciation rate (δ). However, the empirical findings from the
previous chapter questions the validity of this standard assumption. Thus, in this chapter, I pro-
pose a modified capital accumulation equation with an adjustment factor which account for the
installation/dismantling cost, or potential synergistic gains with the existing capital stock.
Through empirical analysis, I find that the quadratic capital adjustment factor introduced in
Chirinko(1993) can help model the divergence between the investment return and marginal prod-
uct of capital observed in the data between 1997-2014. This finding is significant as it suggests
that 1) the aggregate capital estimates, which rely on a standard capital accumulation process, need
modification, and 2) cross-country marginal product of capital and investment return pattern may
differ. This finding of the paper is also consistent with Able and Blanchard (1986), which empiri-
cally documents that “the cost of capital component of q and the marginal profit component to be
highly positively correlated, that is, that the cost of capital and marginal profit move, in general, in
opposite directions. This result is also at variance with what we would expect, if adjustment with
costs were unimportant. If there were no adjustment cost at all, the cost of capital and marginal
profit would always be equal.”
The paper also uses variables that are commonly employed in the empirical literature investi-
gating the Lucas Paradox to examine macroeconomic factors that may affect the capital efficiency
of firms. Despite an extensive effort has been devoted to identify the macroeconomic factors that
affect the aggregate productivity1, there has been relatively little interest in the factors that affect
capital efficiency, i.e., the level of future capital input that can be obtained from a unit investment
today. I find that controlling for per capita output, technology, human capital, financial develop-
ment, and government efficiency all have a positively significant effect on the capital efficiency of
firms. This finding imply that current macroeconomic variables not only affect financial returns
today, but also affect future returns by influencing future levels of the capital input. The exact
mechanism by which these macroeconomic factors affect the firm productivity and the capital ac-
cumulation process is beyond the scope of this paper, but can be a subject for future research.
Although models with capital adjustment factors are widely used in the investment literature,
1see Banerjee and Duflo (2005)
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they have been largely ignored in the Lucas Paradox literature.2 Some of the major papers within
the investment literature that discusses the capital adjustment factors include Hayashi (1982). In
his 1982 paper, Hayashi showss “Tobin’s conjecture that investment is a function of marginal q is
equivalent to the firm’s optimal capital accumulation problem with adjustment costs.” Similarly,
Yoshikawa (1980) shows that “q theory can be derived from a choice theoretic framework which
explicitly takes account of adjustment costs associated with investment.” Cochrane (1991) uses
a neoclassical investment model with cubic adjustment cost to create a production based asset
pricing model and empirically tests the validity of the modified model using the US investment-
to-capital ratio and the CRSP value weighted portfolio return. On the other hand, Chirinko (1993)
uses a quadratic adjustment cost to model when he introduces the investment models with explicit
dynamics.
Modified neoclassical model with capital adjustment is also quite popular in the growth lit-
erature. Uzawa (1969) introduces a capital accumulation equation with friction in his model of
economic growth, and Jorgenson (1963) also endorses these models with modifications saying “A
derivation of this model incorporating installation costs explicitly with constant returns to scale in
both production and installation is obviously much more satisfactory than the original derivation.”
More recent paper, Aoki and Yoshikawa (2002) also introduce capital adjustment factor in their
product demand based model of growth. The finding of this paper is closely related to Onitsuka
(1974), which introduces model with both international capital flows and capital accumulation
frictions into his model to explain long-run growth.
The paper proceed in the following order. In section 2, I explain the model and the empirical
methodology used to examine the capital efficiency. Section 3 describes the firm-level data and
section 4 presents empirical results. Section 5 concludes.
2Keyu Jin (2012) is an exception as she employs a non-standard capital accumulation equation from Abel (2003).
However, her analysis focuses on the effect of comparative advantage rather than the effects of within-country distor-
tions.
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2.2 Benchmark Model and Empirical Methodology
In this section, I introduce the benchmark neoclassical model to define the relationship between
marginal product of capital and investment return. I also describe the empirical methodology used
to test the standard capital accumulation model using the firm-level data.
2.2.1 Benchmark Model and Modifications
Consider a standard neoclassical economy where the representative firm choose capital, invest-
ment, and labor ({Kt, It, Lt}∞t0 ) to maximize the net present value of the future cash flows, in a
competitive factor and goods market:
max
{Kt,It,Lt}∞t0
∑
t≥t0
1
Rt
(Yt − It − wtLt) (2.1)
subject to:
Production function: Yt = F (Kt, Lt) (2.2)
Capital accumulation: Kt+1 = G(Kt, It) (2.3)
Definition: Rt = (1 + rt)(1 + rt−1)...(1 + rt0) (2.4)
Yt is the period output, and the wt and rt is the exogenously determined wage and real interest
rate. The first order conditions yield:
1 + rt =
(
F1(Kt, Lt) +
G1(Kt, It)
G2(Kt, It)
)
G2(Kt−1, It−1) (2.5)
F2(Kt, Lt) = wt (2.6)
for all periods t > t0. Note that equation (2.5) can also be written as :
1 + rt =
F1(Kt, Lt)
pKtt−1
+G1(Kt, It)
p
Kt+1
t
pKtt−1
(2.7)
such that pKt+1t is the relative price of installed capital in period t + 1 in period t output. This
follows from the fact that G2(Kt, It) is the marginal rate of transformation of a consumption good
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in period t to installed capital in period t+ 1 (Cochrane, 1991). Therefore in equilibrium, the price
of an installed capital in period t+ 1 in period t output is
p
Kt+1
t =
1
G2(Kt, It)
(2.8)
and F1(Kt,Lt)
p
Kt
t−1
is a price corrected measure of marginal product of capital that is consistent with
Caselli and Feyrer (2007). 3 It is evident from equation (2.5) that the key determinant of the
relationship between the period marginal product of capital (F1(Kt, Lt)) and the investment return
(rt) is the capital accumulation equation(G(Kt, It)).
The standard neoclassical model assumes a frictionless capital accumulation over time in which
a unit investment leads to a unit increase in capital stock.
Capital accumulation: Kt+1 = G(Kt, It) = (1− δ)Kt + It (2.9)
This relationship implies that the investment return differs from the marginal product of capi-
tal only by the constant depreciation rate (δ). However, the empirical findings from the previ-
ous chapter questions the validity of this standard assumption. Thus, in this section, I introduce
modified capital accumulation equation with an adjustment factor which account for the installa-
tion/dismantling cost, or potential synergistic gains with the existing capital stock.
Consider the following modified capital accumulation conditions:
Kt+1 = G(Kt, It) = (1− δ)Kt + It + βIt (2.9 a)
Kt+1 = G(Kt, It) = (1− δ)Kt + It + β I
2
t
Kt
(2.9 b)
Kt+1 = G(Kt, It) = (1− δ)Kt + It + β I
3
t
K2t
(2.9 c)
3With a standard capital accumulation equation, pKt+1t = 1 for all t, which suggests that buying a unit of capital
at time t costs a unit of consumption good. However, the relative price can diverge from a unity if there exists any
friction in the capital accumulation process.
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These equations are commonly employed in the investment literature and yields the traditional cap-
ital accumulation equation if we set β = 0. In this model, capital cannot be used in production until
it has been installed. The adjustment term, which may be linear, quadratic or cubic in investment,
accounts for the costs incurred in the installation process. This assumption implies, for example
that large investments will increase installation costs firms need to set aside more resources for
the installation. Moreover, in equation (2.9b) and (2.9c), the adjustment costs are inversely pro-
portional to the size of the existing capital stock as firms are less affected by the reallocation of
resources when they have a large capital base. Chirinko(1993), Gilchrist & Himmelberg (1995),
and Keyu Jin (2012)) assume quadratic adjustment costs while Chocrane (1991) assumes a cubic
adjustment cost. In this paper, I test all three equations for the best fit.
The investment theory literature assumes that β is negative, as it is the cost incurred in the
installation process. However, there also exists an extensive research in the finance literature that
studies potential synergies in corporate mergers. 4 Here, the fact that the value of the combined
firm can exceed the sum of assets in the individual firms suggests that a unit investment can lead to a
more than one unit increase in the aggregate capital stock. Therefore, I do not place any restrictions
on the sign of β. If β < 0 then a unit of investment leads to a less than one unit increase in the
aggregate capital stock (a friction) and if β > 0 a unit of investment leads to a greater than one unit
increase in the aggregate capital stock (a synergy). Note that with β 6= 0 cross-country investment
return pattern may deviate from marginal product of capital pattern depending on the sign and the
magnitude of β.5
4see Brigham (1983), Horne (1983), Chang (1988)
5For example, replacing (2.9) with (2.9b), the firm’s FOC yields:
1 + rt =
F1(Kt, Lt)
pktt−1
+
(
1− δ + β
(
It
Kt
)2)
p
kt+1
t
pktt−1
=
F1(Kt, Lt)
pktt−1
+
(
Kt − It
Kt
)
p
kt+1
t
pktt−1
With the additional quadratic adjustment term, investment return now depends not only on the marginal product of
capital but also the investment-capital ratio.
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2.2.2 Empirical Methodology
In this subsection, I describe the empirical methods used to test the capital accumulation equa-
tion using the firm-level market and accounting data. Note that equation (2.9a)-(2.9c) can also be
written as
Kt+1 −Kt − It
Kt
= −δ + β
(
It
Kt
)
(2.9 a)
Kt+1 −Kt − It
Kt
= −δ + β
(
It
Kt
)2
(2.9 b)
Kt+1 −Kt − It
Kt
= −δ + β
(
It
Kt
)3
(2.9 c)
Using above equations as the benchmark, I define the following variables to test the validity of
the standard capital accumulation equation:
IKRatioc,t,i,f =
(
Adj∆Assetc,t,i,f
(MVAc,t−1,i,f )(1 + inflc,t)
)
(2.10)
DKc,t,i,f =
−Adj∆Assetc,t,i,f +MVAc,t,i,f −MVAc,t−1,i,f
MVAc,t−1,i,f
− inflc,t (2.11)
IKRatioc,t,i,f is investment to capital ratio( ItKt ) of firm f in industry i in country c in year t.
MVAc,t,i,f is the current market value of the firm’s assets, which is calibrated as the sum of book
value of debt and market value of equity. This market measure of capital stock is more accurate
than the book value of asset, which is measured at the acquisition cost. Note that period t capital
stock (Kt) is estimated as the market value of asset at the end of period t − 1 as it is an input
that is used to produce output (Yt) at the end of period t. Therefore, the ratio is adjusted for
period t inflation (inflc,t). Adj∆Assetc,t,i,f is a measure of period investment, which is defined
as Adj∆Assetc,t,i,f = ∆Assetc,t,i,f + Depreciationc,t,i,f . ∆Assetc,t,i,f is the change in the book
value of assets. This measures the current value of tangible asset investments by firms as financial
statements are filed using the historical basis approach, i.e., assets are valued at the acquisition
price. This definition of a firm-level capital stock and investment-to-capital ratio is consistent with
the previous chapter and Fama and French (1999). DKc,t,i,f is change in capital stock that remains
unexplained in the standard capital accumulation process
(
Kt+1−Kt−It
Kt
)
. If the standard model is
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correct, then DKc,t,i,f should have no dependence on IKRatioc,t,i,f .
As stated in the previous chapter, adj∆Assetc,t,i,f does not include most of the investment in
Research and development (R&D), as R&D costs are taken as expenses on financial statements
due to the accounting conservatism. This may downwardly bias the estimate of IKRatioc,t,i,f
by underestimating the level of investment in R&D heavy industries or countries. The market
value of assets, MVAc,t−1,i,f , on the other hand, does include the value of the intangible assets
in the firm as the market observes the outcome of R&D activities. However, if omitted R&D
investment is the sole driver of the observed gap, then higher-order investment-to-capital ratio
(IKRatio2c,t,i,f orIKRatio
3
c,t,i,f ) should not be statistically significant in the regression analysis as
the effect of omission on DKc,t,i,f should be linear; i.e. omitted R&D investment may affect the
level of IKRatioc,t,i,f , but it should not affect the curvature of the capital accumulation process.
2.3 Data
Financial and market data used to calculate the IKRatioc,t,i,f and DKc,t,i,f are from World-
scope Datastream. Datastream is a commonly used source of data for the cross-country compar-
ison at the firm-level because it not only provides an extensive accounting and market data on
listed firms across countries, but also aims to “provide the data in a manner that allows maxi-
mum comparability between one company and another, and between various reporting regimes”
(Worldscope/Disclosure Partners, 1992). These adjustments by the Worldscope help minimize the
potential bias from the cross-country differences in accounting standards, and make it a preferred
source for firm-level accounting data.
The countries used in the analysis are MSCI emerging and developed countries; Saudi Arabia
is dropped from the sample due to the limited availability of firm-level data before mid-2000s. As
in the previous chapter, within the Worldscope dataset, I exclude firm-years with missing market
value, assets, liabilities, depreciation, EBITDA, or extraordinary gains/cost. I also drop balance-
sheet insolvent firm-years when total liabilities exceed total assets. As period t−1 asset values are
used to calculate IKRatioc,t,i,f and DKc,t,i,f , firm-years without debt and market value from the
previous year are also excluded from the sample.
As in the previous chapter, both IKRatioc,t,i,f and DKc,t,i,f are winsorized at 1% and 99% by
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country to control for the outliers, following the accounting practice.6 Table 2.1 provides summary
statistics for the two variables. It shows that the mean and the median for DKc,t,i,f are smaller in
emerging-market countries relative to the developed countries, suggesting a greater deviation from
the standard capital accumulation path in the emerging market countries. Mean and the median for
IKRatopc,t,i,f , on the other hand are higher in the emerging market countries, which suggest that
the effect of adjustment costs on the capital accumulation process may depend on the relative level
of aggregate development within the economy. Based on this summary statistics, in the following
section, I investigate the effect of not only the capital adjustment factor, but also macroeconomic
indicators on DKc,t,i,f .
2.4 Modified Capital Accumulation Model
2.4.1 Testing Modified Capital Accumulation Model
Using the two variables described in the previous section, I test the validity of the standard
capital accumulation by using the following two specifications:
DKc,t,i,f = α + β1Dt + β2Fi + η1Adjc,t,i,f + γXc,t,i,f + c,t,i,f (2.12)
Equation (2.12) analyses the effects of adjustment costs, Adjc,t,i,f , on the capital accumu-
lation process, DKc,t,i,f , to test the validity of the capital adjustment factor. Adjc,t,i,f may be
IKRatioc,t,i,f , IKRatio2c,t,i,f or IKRatio
3
c,t,i,f and measures adjustment cost/gain for firm f in in-
dustry i in country c in period t. PCGDPc,t is the purchasing power parity adjusted real per capita
GDP in country c in period t in 2011 US dollars that I use as a proxy for output per unit labor. Dt
and Fi are time and industry dummies that are added to control for global macroeconomic shocks
that occurred during the period of analysis, or an industry specific trend. Xc,t,i,f is the vector of
firm specific factors, which includes the log size (the book value of assets denominated in USD;
the value is adjusted for the inflation using the CPI index), leverage (book debt to equity ratio), and
the equity price-to-book ratio. The errors are also clustered in country-year groups as in Chapter 1.
If the standard capital accumulation equation is correct, then the Adjc,t,i,f ought to be statistically
6see Konchitchki (2013), Barth, Landsman and Lang (2008), and Barth, Konchitchki, Landsman (2013)
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insignificant.
Column 1-3 of Table 2.2 shows that IKRatioc,t,i,f , IKRatio2c,t,i,f , IKRatio
3
c,t,i,f are positive
and statistically significant between 1997 and 2014. This finding implies that modified capital ac-
cumulation equation describes the capital accumulation more accurately than the standard model,
and suggests that the aggregate capital estimates, which rely on a standard capital accumulation
process need modification. The adjusted R-squared value is highest for the model with quadratic
adjustment factor, so for the future empirical analysis I use the quadratic adjustment factor follow-
ing Chirinko(1993).
2.4.2 Macroeconomic factors
As stated earlier, summary statistics of DKc,t,i,f and IKRatioc,t,i,f suggest that the effect of
adjustment factor on capital accumulation process depends on the relative level of aggregate de-
velopment. Numerous macroeconomic factors have been discussed in the Lucas Paradox literature
as the sources of inefficiency in emerging market countries but most of the analysis focused on
their effect on the aggregate productive efficiency, and the effect on the capital efficiency remain
relatively unexplored. Higher level of capital efficiency should increase the investment return as
higher level of future capital stock can be obtained from a unit investment today. Therefore in
this section, I study macroeconomic variables commonly used in the development literature and
investigate potential macroeconomic factors that could lead to frictions/synergies in the capital
accumulation process.
Table 2.3 summarizes some of the factors that has been discussed in the development literature.
The variables used in the analysis include human capital, institutional quality, financial develop-
ment, and technology.
Human Capital: Consider the following modified Cobb-Douglas function with human capital:
Y = AKα(hL)1−α
where h is the level of human capital. This modified production function yields the following
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expression for the marginal product of capital:
∂Y
∂K
= αA
1
αh1−α+
1
αy
α−1
α
If the level of total factor of productivity (A) and human capital(h) is identical across countries,
then the marginal product of capital should be completely determined by the relative level of per
capita output as predicted in the neoclassical model. However, if the assumption is violated cross-
country difference in the marginal product of capital may deviate from the predicted values based
on the model. Therefore an extensive effort has been devoted to identify the macroeconomic factors
that affect the aggregate productivity.
Human capital is one of the most commonly employed predictor variable in the development
literature, and has been suggested as a potential solution to Lucas paradox by Lucas himself. Table
2.3 shows that human capital based on education is highest in the US (3.63) and the lowest in
India(1.76). All MSCI developed countries except Spain and Portugal have human capital index
greater than 3, but only a few emerging countries (Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, Russia, and
South Korea) tops this threshold number.7 For the empirical analysis, I use percent population with
tertiary (or secondary) education as the measure of human capital.
Government Institutions: As stated in Alfaro, et al (2008) “ ‘cluster of institutions,’ includ-
ing constraints on government expropriation, independent judiciary, property rights enforcement,
and institutions providing equal rights and ensuring civil liberties, are important to encourage in-
vestment and growth.” Thus, in this paper I construct institution quality measure using the World
Governance Indicators by World Bank. The World Governance Indicator measures: Control of
Corruption, Government Effectiveness, Regulatory Quality, Rule of Law, Political Stability and
Voice and Accountability. I take the average of the five indexes, linearly interpolating the missing
values in each index. Within the MSCI developed and emerging countries, the rating is the highest
in Finland and the Nordic countries, and the lowest in Russia and China.
7One major drawback of this index is that it does not account for the on-the-job learning, highlighted by Lucas
(1990).
52
Financial Development: The measure of financial development is from the International Mon-
etary Fund (IMF). The financial development index summarizes the accessibility, efficiency and
the depth of the financial market and institutions within the economy.8 Limited access to finan-
cial institutions has been discussed as a source of inefficiency in emerging countries by Banerjee
and Duflo (2005), where they document a large within-country variance in the interest rate. Hsieh
and Klenow (2009) further argues that financial system can lead to a more efficient allocation of
capital within the economy, increasing the aggregate productivity. As shown in Table 13, within
the MSCI developed and emerging countries, Switzerland (0.97) has the highest level of financial
development, and Peru has the lowest level of development.
Patents/Technology: The number of triadic patent families is used to proxy for the country’s
ability to innovate. Triadic patents families is a series of corresponding patents filed at the Euro-
pean Patent Office (EPO), the United States Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO) and the Japan
Patent Office (JPO), for the same invention, by the same applicant or inventor. It is a better proxy
for the R&D level of the firms than the total number of patent applications as triadic patent families
is the ”database of ’high-quality’ inventions” (Popp, 2007) which excludes inventions/innovations
with zero commercial value. The average number of triadic patents over the analysis period is the
highest in Japan (15,135), and is the lowest in Peru (0.4).
Although literature thus far remained relatively silent on the effect of the macroeconomic fac-
tors on the capital efficiency, these factors are likely to have a significant effect on the capital
installation process. As loss and damage of goods in the capital transportation/allocation process
has often been cited as one of the major sources of the capital frictions in emerging countries, bet-
ter institutions, and financial development can help minimize the capital adjustment cost through
efficient allocation of resources. Technological innovation should increase the possibility of capital
synergy as countries with greater innovative power are likely to generate more value from the unit
investment.
To test the effect of the macroeconomic variables on the capital efficiency, I use the following
8See Svirydzenka (2016)
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equation:
DKc,t,i,f = α + β1Dt + β2Fi + ηIKRatio
2
c,t,i,f ∗Macroc,t + γXc,t,i,f + c,t,i,f (2.13)
This is a modified version of equation (2.12), and includes IKRatio2c,t,i,f ∗Macroc,t to measure
the effect of the macroeconomic factors discussed above. If the discussed factors affect installation
process, then the effect should be most acutely felt by the firms that engage in intensive capital
investment, and therefore IKRatio2c,t,i,f ∗Macroc,t should be statistically significant.
Table 2.4 summarizes the regression result for equation (2.13), which measures the effect of
the macroeconomic variables on the capital efficiency of the firms. The table shows that triadic
patents, government efficiency, financial development index, and human capital all have a posi-
tively significant effect on the capital efficiency of firms. This finding suggests better utilization of
resources, and higher level of education can help minimize the capital adjustment friction and help
create synergies. The result presented in this subsection implies that the macroeconomic factors
of production discussed in the development literature affect not only the production today, but also
the production in the future by increasing 1) the level of output for a given input, and 2) the future
capital input that can be obtained from a unit investment today. The exact mechanism behind this
effect is beyond the scope of this paper, but should be a subject of the future research.
2.5 Conclusion
Standard capital accumulation equation, which suggests that the capital stock tomorrow is the
sum of capital stock today and the investment net of depreciation (Kt+1 = (1− δ)Kt + It), imply
that investment return and marginal product of capital differ only by a constant depreciation rate
(δ). Therefore, marginal product of capital has been extensively used in the Lucas Paradox litera-
ture to explain the lack of cross-country capital flow from rich country to poor countries. However,
the empirical findings of the previous chapter show that while there exists a statistically signifi-
cant relationship between per capita GDP and the marginal product of capital, no such relationship
exists between per capita GDP and investment returns.
In this chapter, I investigate the capital accumulation path, the key equation that link marginal
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product of capital and investment returns. I show using the firm-level data that the standard capital
accumulation does not hold empirically; i.e. a unit investment does not lead to a unit increase
in capital stock. This result is significant as it 1) questions the accuracy of the aggregate capital
stock estimate, which rely on the standard capital accumulation process, and 2) implies that cross-
country investment and marginal product of capital patterns can differ as investment return depends
not only on the marginal product of capital, but also investment-to-capital ratio. This finding sug-
gests that a potential solution to Lucas Paradox may be the domestic factors that affect the capital
accumulation process within the economy. Therefore, I use commonly employed macroeconomic
variables and test their effect of the capital accumulation process. The empirical results of the
paper suggests that technology, human capital, financial development and government efficiency,
all have a significant effect in improving the capital efficiency of the firms.
However, this paper does not describe the channels by which these macroeconomic factors af-
fect the firm productivity and the capital accumulation process, and the macroeconomic indicators
used in the macroeconomic factor analysis are likely to be highly correlated. Therefore, for the
further analysis on the subject should employ micro-level data on financial development and insti-
tutional quality to provide a more insightful results regarding the cross-country difference in the
capital efficiency of the firms.
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Table 2.1: Summary Statistics: Capital Friction and Investment-Capital Ratio
DKc,t,i,f =
−adj∆Assetc,t,i,f + ∆MVAc,t,i,f
MVAc,t−1,i,f
− inflc,t
IKRatioc,t,i,f =
(
adj∆Assetc,t,i,f
(MVAc,t−1,i,f )(1 + inflc,t)
)
DKc,t,i,f is the ratio between the sum of change in the market value of asset less the change in the book value of asset and the market value of
asset from the previous year adjusted for the CPI inflation. IKRatioc,t,i,f is the ratio between the change in the book value of asset market value
of asset adjusted for the CPI inflation.
DK IKRatio
Mean Median SD Mean Median SD
Australia AUS 0.180 -0.043 0.922 0.139 0.057 0.487
Austria AUT -0.032 -0.050 0.254 0.093 0.070 0.190
Brazil BRA -0.033 -0.057 0.262 0.087 0.067 0.179
Belgium BEL -0.044 -0.092 0.305 0.147 0.104 0.220
Canada CAN 0.064 -0.049 0.613 0.155 0.081 0.385
Chile CHL -0.045 -0.076 0.271 0.118 0.089 0.206
China CHN 0.085 -0.050 0.548 0.112 0.071 0.181
Colombia COL -0.068 -0.106 0.325 0.187 0.126 0.265
Czech Republic CZE -0.101 -0.110 0.234 0.104 0.089 0.171
Denmark DNK -0.015 -0.059 0.318 0.087 0.059 0.202
Finland FIN -0.007 -0.043 0.288 0.079 0.054 0.185
France FRA -0.021 -0.050 0.281 0.096 0.067 0.181
Germany DEU -0.018 -0.046 0.319 0.079 0.058 0.212
Greece GRC 0.046 -0.074 0.775 0.095 0.062 0.225
Hong Kong HKG 0.085 -0.062 0.730 0.175 0.091 0.507
Hungary HUN -0.105 -0.123 0.283 0.117 0.095 0.246
India IND -0.059 -0.131 0.397 0.163 0.110 0.250
Indonesia IDN -0.039 -0.109 0.418 0.172 0.103 0.324
Ireland IRL 0.056 -0.025 0.514 0.104 0.071 0.254
Israel ISR 0.012 -0.046 0.396 0.082 0.056 0.236
Italy ITA -0.049 -0.060 0.212 0.092 0.059 0.212
Japan JPN -0.025 -0.046 0.229 0.049 0.043 0.124
Malaysia MYS -0.045 -0.072 0.291 0.096 0.070 0.211
Mexico MEX -0.042 -0.063 0.254 0.113 0.099 0.178
Netherlands NLD -0.010 -0.041 0.288 0.089 0.064 0.197
New Zealand NZL -0.003 -0.042 0.312 0.086 0.055 0.240
Norway NOR 0.012 -0.049 0.437 0.134 0.081 0.320
Peru PER 0.003 -0.066 0.466 0.148 0.093 0.259
Philippines PHL 0.014 -0.069 0.496 0.121 0.075 0.284
Poland POL -0.011 -0.067 0.438 0.133 0.085 0.307
Portugal PRT -0.053 -0.069 0.180 0.109 0.068 0.214
Russia RUS -0.111 -0.141 0.377 0.192 0.147 0.261
Singapore SGP -0.015 -0.069 0.383 0.110 0.074 0.250
South Africa ZAF -0.025 -0.070 0.364 0.139 0.095 0.345
South Korea KOR -0.023 -0.075 0.364 0.138 0.094 0.284
Spain ESP -0.015 -0.044 0.250 0.110 0.069 0.227
Sweden SWE 0.052 -0.022 0.471 0.100 0.056 0.277
Switzerland CHE 0.012 -0.021 0.285 0.057 0.044 0.168
Thailand THA 0.007 -0.056 0.352 0.106 0.078 0.191
Turkey TUR -0.085 -0.133 0.423 0.187 0.131 0.257
United Kingdom GBR 0.018 -0.046 0.468 0.107 0.060 0.296
United States USA 0.045 -0.036 0.518 0.089 0.059 0.230
MSCI 0.015 -0.055 0.472 0.105 0.065 0.265
MSCI Developed 0.007 -0.048 0.375 0.100 0.064 0.241
MSCI Emerging -0.034 -0.087 0.386 0.133 0.094 0.243
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Table 2.2: Testing Capital Accumulation Path
IKratio is the ratio between the change in the book value of asset and the market value of asset adjusted for the CPI inflation. Purchasing Power
Parity (PPP) adjusted per hour GDP (PHGDP) is calibrated using the PPP adjusted GDP(rgdpo), and population (pop) estimates from the Penn
World Table 9.0. Size is the inflation adjusted book value of the firm’s asset in US dollar, and leverage is the ratio between the book value of
liability and the assets. Price-to-Book measures the ratio between the market and the book value of the firm equity. Time dummies and industry
dummies for the 48 Fama-French Industries are included in all regressions. Standard deviation is reported in the parenthesis.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
DK DK DK DK
97-14 97-14 97-14 97-14
IKRatio 0.283***
(0.0267)
IKRatioˆ2 0.213***
(0.0194)
IKRatioˆ3 0.0589***
(0.00813)
log(size) -0.00898*** -0.0110*** -0.00849*** -0.00887***
(0.00226) (0.00235) (0.00219) (0.00224)
Leverage -0.0854*** -0.0846*** -0.0826*** -0.0825***
(0.0185) (0.0181) (0.0179) (0.0181)
Price-to-Book 0.000229** 0.000235** 0.000233** 0.000230**
(8.99e-05) (9.17e-05) (9.06e-05) (9.01e-05)
Constant 0.143*** 0.138*** 0.123*** 0.138***
(0.0487) (0.0470) (0.0470) (0.0485)
Observations 334,608 334,608 334,608 334,608
R-squared 0.071 0.094 0.104 0.088
Time Dummies Y Y Y Y
Industry Dummies Y Y Y Y
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Table 2.3: Macroeconomic Factors Summary Statistics
PPP adjusted
PCGDP (2014)
Human Capital
Index
Financial Development
Index Triadic Patents
Government
Efficiency
Australia AUS 44,241 3.48 0.86 355 1.59
Austria AUT 45,705 3.21 0.67 317 1.60
Belgium BEL 14,811 3.04 0.66 435 1.33
Brazil BRA 39,950 2.30 0.57 53 0.01
Canada CAN 43,368 3.58 0.82 579 1.63
Chile CHL 21,317 2.89 0.47 6 1.14
China CHN 12,513 2.28 0.48 558 (0.52)
Colombia COL 12,858 2.29 0.31 3 (0.48)
Czech Republic CZE 29,187 3.60 0.35 19 0.82
Denmark DNK 44,423 3.38 0.74 276 1.83
Finland FIN 38,343 3.24 0.63 332 1.89
France FRA 38,584 2.99 0.73 2,511 1.21
Germany DEU 46,507 3.61 0.76 5,802 1.50
Greece GRC 24,685 2.85 0.57 13 0.61
Hong Kong HKG 45,134 2.98 0.76 26 1.31
Hungary HUN 22,750 3.13 0.48 38 0.84
India IND 5,452 1.88 0.41 166 (0.26)
Indonesia IDN 9,798 2.29 0.32 2 (0.63)
Ireland IRL 51,927 2.95 0.79 65 1.51
Israel ISR 31,606 3.43 0.57 333 0.60
Italy ITA 35,324 2.89 0.77 756 0.66
Japan JPN 35,566 3.43 0.78 15,135 1.15
Malaysia MYS 21,650 2.75 0.62 15 0.36
Mexico MEX 15,520 2.52 0.35 15 (0.11)
Netherlands NLD 48,178 3.21 0.79 1,158 1.73
New Zealand NZL 34,066 3.26 0.62 57 1.77
Norway NOR 78,293 3.47 0.69 108 1.72
Peru PER 10,931 2.68 0.30 0 (0.30)
Philippines PHL 6,638 2.52 0.35 3 (0.36)
Poland POL 24,450 3.13 0.42 24 0.68
Portugal PRT 27,047 2.28 0.68 14 1.10
Russia RUS 24,056 3.22 0.43 75 (0.73)
Singapore SGP 66,482 2.87 0.72 94 1.50
South Africa ZAF 12,067 2.32 0.55 35 0.32
South Korea KOR 34,955 3.34 0.79 1,527 0.67
Spain ESP 32,858 2.73 0.87 195 1.01
Sweden SWE 42,605 3.27 0.74 784 1.76
Switzerland CHE 62,637 3.59 0.97 947 1.76
Thailand THA 13,725 2.41 0.54 7 (0.05)
Turkey TUR 19,675 2.12 0.44 14 (0.15)
United Kingdom GBR 38,757 3.60 0.89 1,843 1.49
United States USA 51,959 3.64 0.87 14,212 1.32
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Table 2.4: Macroeconomic factors and Capital Efficiency
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
VARIABLES DK DK DK DK DK DK DK
97-14 97-14 97-14 97-14 97-14 97-14 97-14
IKratioˆ2 0.213***
(0.0194)
IKratioˆ2*log(PCGDP) 0.0204***
(0.00190)
IKratioˆ2*Triadic Patents 3.98e-05***
(4.53e-06)
IKratioˆ2*Govn’t Efficiency 0.148***
(0.0136)
IKratioˆ2*Financial
Development 0.272***
(0.0242)
IKratioˆ2*Secondary Education 0.00278***
(0.000213)
IKratioˆ2*Tertiary Education 0.00768***
(0.000428)
Constant 0.123*** 0.123*** 0.125*** 0.120** 0.124*** 0.124*** 0.125***
(0.0470) (0.0469) (0.0433) (0.0464) (0.0464) (0.0460) (0.0446)
Observations 334,608 334,608 334,608 334,608 334,608 334,608 334,608
R-squared 0.104 0.104 0.085 0.103 0.106 0.107 0.109
Time Dummies Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Industry Dummies Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
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CHAPTER 3
MULTI-CONE EVIDENCE FROM THE FIRM-LEVEL DATA
3.1 Introduction
For decades Heckscher-Ohlin(H-O) model has been a workhorse model in the international
trade literature providing an explicit and tractable predictions about the link between the coun-
try’s endowment, industry factor requirements and the international trade. H-O models trade as
a transfer of endowments, where exchange of goods is “indirect factor arbitrage, transferring the
services of otherwise immobile factors of production from locations where these factors are abun-
dant to locations where they are scarce.” (Leamer, 1995) Therefore, assuming identical technology
across countries, the theory suggests that countries export goods that intensively use the factors of
production that are relatively abundant locally.
The research has particularly flowered in the one-cone version of the model, which assumes
that countries produce the same set of goods. In this set-up, the international trade equalizes
factor prices globally even in the absence of the international factor mobility (FPE, Factor price
equalization theorem). However, despite wide-spread use of the one-cone H-O model, empirical
examination of the FPE theorem has yielded a rather disappointing results. Even Ohlin(1933)
stated “Complete equality of factor prices is ... almost unthinkable and certainly highly improba-
ble.” Thus, although it is easy to dismiss the FPE empirically, “the real question isn’t whether FPE
is true or not. Trust us, it isn’t true. The real question is what causes the violation that we observe.”
(Leamer and Levinsohn, 1994)
Popular answers to the question posed in Leamer and Levinsohn is technology difference,
which gained a significant attention following the seminal paper by Leontief (1953). In this paper,
Leontief points out that US exports were less capital intensive relative to its imports despite the
fact that US is the most capital abundant country. In this paper, Leontief suggested that the cross-
country productivity difference can explain the observed phenomena; US is labor intensive when
one adjust for the productivity difference across countries. Trefler (1993) takes the argument step
further by showing that productivity difference across countries can explain much of the factor
price variation across countries. Interest in cross-country difference in productivity also led some
researchers (e.g. Stern and Maskus, 1981) to move away from two-factor (labor, and capital) to
3-factor model including human capital as an additional input to explained the observed patterns
in international trade.
Multi-cone version of the model, where countries produce differentiated goods, hasn’t gained
much attention until more recently. One of the most heavily cited papers on multi-cone H-O model
is Schott (2003), which showed using US import data that unit value of exports vary systematically
with exporter relative factor endowment. This finding contradicts the implications of single-cone
H-O model, as no systematic relationship should be found between relative factor endowment
and the product price due to factor price equalization (FPE). However, this empirical finding is
consistent with the multi-cone version of the H-O theory, where countries specialize in production
of final goods.
In the paper, Schott also suggests a new framework for testing the multi-cone version of the
H-O model. Unlike others in the literature which searched for the evidence of specialization across
industries, Schott suggested that the countries do not specialize across industries, but within; i.e.
the “capital- and skill-abundant countries use their endowment advantage to produce vertically
superior varieties”. This finding is significant as it suggests that previous empirical researches
that showed little evidence of endowment driven specialization across industries cannot rule-out
the mutli-cone version of the H-O model. Thus, there is no prima facie reason to believe that
the countries occupy the identical cone of production. Other key papers on the subject include
Deardorff (2000) which investigated the effect of growth on the international trade patterns in the
multi-cone setting, and Debaere and Demiroglu (2003), which showed that the endowments are
too dissimilar across countries to ensure production of the same set of goods across countries.
More recently, Xiang (2007) showed that the factor intensities difference among the countries are
sufficiently different across countries, implying a weak factor market linkage across countries.
In this paper, I first reaffirm the finding of Schott using the firm-level accounting and market
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data. In his 2003 paper, Schott used the unit import prices as a measure of the industry input
intensity in the respective country. Although it is a good proxy, it is still an indirect measure of
factor price. In this paper, I use the firm-level marginal product of capital estimate to test the
multi-cone version of the H-O model. I show that there is a statistically significant downward
relationship between the relative aggregate endowment and the firm return to capital even after
adjusting for the firm specific factors, empirical finding that is in-line with Schott (2003).
While this relationship between the firm return to capital supports the multi-cone version of the
H-O model, which allows factor price variation across countries, it may also be driven by technol-
ogy difference across countries; i.e. is the observed empirical findings due to greater efficiency in
production in developed countries relative to emerging or is there a quality difference between the
products manufactured? I therefore use firm-level output-to-capital ratio to show that technology
difference cannot sufficiently describe the observed trend. Technology difference suggests that
output-to-capital ratio and marginal product of capital have identical cross-country patterns. How-
ever, empirical result using the firm-level data suggests that although marginal product of capital
decrease with relative level of per capita GDP, the output-per capita increase with per capita GDP.
This finding is consistent a vertical specialization, and the quality-ladder model of trade.
The vertical specialization implied by the data relates this paper to Acemoglu and Ventura
(2002) and Cunat and Maffezzoli (2002), which study the effect of cross-country specialization
on convergence. Their result suggests vertical specialization and the innovation may permanently
set apart the developed and emerging economies, as the rich countries continuously innovate a
superior product. This finding is consistent with Grossman and Helpman (1991) in that it suggests
that the high wage countries continue to lead the emerging countries over time with its ability to
innovate the higher quality product.
This paper is also related to emerging body of literature in the development economics that at-
tempts to investigate the link between macroeconomy and the firm-level accounting earnings. Ear-
lier works in the field includes Davis, et al (1992), which documented a reallocation of resources
within industry following an exogenous shock using a plant level data. Others have studied the
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difference in the firm characteristics between the exporters and non-exporters within the country.1
This papers differs from the others in that I attempt to draw the aggregate trend using the firm-level
accounting data. This approach is based on the Konchitchki and Patatoukas (2014), which found
that accounting earnings growth is an incrementally significant leading indicator of growth in nom-
inal Gross Domestic Product (GDP), documenting a significant link between the accounting and
macroeconomic data.
The paper proceeds as follows. In section 2, I introduce the basic Heckscher Ohlin model of
comparative advantage and its predictions about international factor price convergence. Section
3 describes the firm-level data used in the analysis and the summary statistics. Section 4 and 5
present empirical results; I show that the observed trend is more consistent with the multi-cone
version of the H-O model than single-cone version with cross-country technological differences.
Section 6 concludes.
3.2 Benchmark Model: Heckscher Ohlin model of Comparative Advantage
The essence of Heckscher Ohlin theorem is well described in the Lerner diagram shown in
Figure 1. The diagram features the world with two factors of production (Labor and Capital),
and four industries (Electronics, Machinery, Textile, and Food Products). Industries differ in the
required input intensity, as shown by the slopes of the line connecting the isoquants and the origin.
In this set-up, Electronics is the most capital intensive industry, and Food Products is the most
labor intensive industry. The four lines from the origin, delineate the cones of production. In
this set-up, capital intensive Japan, which enjoy lower cost of capital should produce Electronics
and Machinery, whereas labor intensive Philippines and India should produce Textile and Food
Products. Countries do not have an incentive to produce goods in industries that lie outside the
cone, since diverting the factors of production will yield a lower output.
As shown in Figure 1, if two countries to occupy the same cone of production, they must share
the same unit cost line. Therefore the factor price should identical in India and Philippines, which
lie the same cone of production. On the other hand, unit cost line is steeper for Japan relative to
1See Aw and Hwang(1995), and Bernard and Jensen (1995)
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Philippines. Therefore, two countries Japan and Philippines that occupy different cones will face
different factor costs. Relative to Philippines, capital cost (return to capital) in Japan will be lower
but the labor cost (wages) will be higher.
The algebra behind the Lerner diagram is as follows. Consider a small open economy, where
agents share identical homothetic preference. There is costless transfer of goods across countries
(perfect mobility of goods) but factors are immobile across borders. Within each country, there is
perfectly competitive factor and goods market. There is a single constant return to scale technology
for each good and there is no factor intensity reversals. In this set-up, each country faces the
resource constraint
Aq ≤ v (3.1)
such that A is the technology matrix that convert factors to goods, q is the output vector and v
is the factor endowment vector. If dimension of the v and q are identical (i.e. number of factors
equal the number of goods produced within the country), then technology matrix can be inverted
to yield the following factor market clearing condition.
Factor Market Clearing Condition: q = A−1v (3.2)
Since firms in each country produce in the competitive market, they will satisfy the zero profit
condition
Zero Profit Condition: w = A′−1p (3.3)
such that p is the vector of product price, andw is the vector of factor price. This equation has three
interesting features: it 1) relates the global price of goods, to the local price of factors; 2) shows that
if countries produce the same goods (thus share same A), they should share the same factor price
since price of goods are identical everywhere due to free trade; and 3) suggests that the factor return
doesn’t change with the level of endowment (v) within the cone of diversification. The latter is
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the essence of the Factor Price Equalization condition that has been put forth by Samuelson(1948).
Within the cone, increase in endowment of labor leads to an increased production of labor-intensive
good without changing the factor price; factor price adjust only when country moves out of the cone
of diversification.
As all individuals have identical homothetic tastes, each agent will consume equal proportion
(s) of goods produced in the world. Based on this observation, one can write the Heckscher-Ohlin-
Vanek (Vanek, 1968) relationship of the international trade flows:
Heckscher-Ohlin-Vanek theorem: T = q − c = A−1(v − svw) (3.4)
T is the vector of net exports, and c is the goods consumption vector. The second equality sug-
gests that the ”traded commodities are really bundles of factors... The exchange of commodities
internationally is therefore indirect factor arbitrage, transferring the services of otherwise immo-
bile factors of production from location where these factors are abundant to locations where they
are scarce.” (Leamer,1995). This relationship suggests that countries indirectly export relatively
abundant factors and and import relatively scarce factor.
In the following chapters, I will focus on the equation (3), which relates the factor price and the
goods produced. In the single-cone model, the factor price shouldn’t vary with the changes in the
relative factor endowment. Thus, a systematic relationship between the factor price and relative
factor endowment across countries should provide an evidence in favor of the multi-cone version
of the model.
3.3 Empirical Methodology and Data
3.3.1 Empirical Methodology
Consider a standard economies where firm maximizes profit by producing that quantity of
output where marginal product equals marginal cost. Under the standard Cobb-Douglas production
function, firm’s marginal product of capital is
MPK = α
y
k
(3.5)
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such that α is the capital share, y is the output and k is the capital. Since α is the capital share
in output, this expression suggests that the marginal product of capital is the ratio between the
portion of earnings that accrue to capital holders (in the model these is simply the firm), and the
firm’s assets.2 This expression is quite similar to ROA, an accounting measure of firm profitability
that is the ratio between the firm’s net earning and the total assets. In this paper, ROA is calibrated
using two different methods:
ROAbc,t,i,f =
EBITDAc,t,i,f
Assetc,t−1,i,f (1+inflc,t)
(3.6)
ROAvc,t,i,f =
EBITDAc,t,i,f
(Debtc,t−1,i,f+MVc,t−1,i,f )(1+inflc,t)
(3.7)
ROAb represents the ROA calculated using a book value of an asset, a standard approach used in
the accounting literature. Value of asset at the end of period t− 1 is used in the denominator as it
is the amount that the firm owned entering period t, and thus was capital that was employed during
period t to generate the EBITDAc,t,i,f . Inflc,t represents the inflation in country c in period
t. One main issue with using the book value of an asset is that it doesn’t represent the ”current”
value of assets in place. Thus, to check the robustness of the result, I also repeat the regression
using ROAv, which uses book value of debt(Debtc,t−1,i,f ) and market value of equity(MVc,t−1,i,f )
to estimate the current value of an asset in period t − 1. Under perfect capital market, this should
correctly estimate a replacement value of an asset.
3.3.2 Data Descriptions
In this paper, I limit my analysis to listed firms in MSCI emerging and developed countries as
these countries make up majority of the world exports and imports.3 This is a simplification, but
should be able to provide a good approximation of the model as these countries accounted for more
than 80% of the world exports by value as of 2011 according to the World Trade Report (2013).
Financial and market data used to calculate the return to capital for firms in these countries are
2Note that this general expression of the marginal product of capital should hold even if the firms have increas-
ing/decreasing return to scale Cobb-Douglas type production function
3Saudi Arabia is dropped from the sample due to limited availability of the firm-level data in early-2000s.
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obtained from Worldscope Datastream. Datastream is a preferred source of data for the cross-
country comparison because it not only provides an extensive accounting and market data on
listed firms across countries, but also aims to “provide the data in a manner that allows maxi-
mum comparability between one company and another, and between various reporting regimes”
(Worldscope/Disclosure Partners, 1992). These adjustments by the Worldscope help minimize the
potential bias from the cross-country differences in accounting standards.
Although Worldscope ”makes several adjustments to the data to make the definitions more
comparable to their US counterparts,”(Wald, 1999), the difference in accounting standard across
countries can severely skew the result. Thus, for precision, I further check for the effects of
cross-country differences in accounting standards by running robustness test restricting the anal-
ysis to the countries that adopted International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS). Since the
mid-2000s there has been increasing attempt led by Euro-zone countries to unify the accounting
standards across countries. This has led to a formation of International Accounting Standards
Boards (IASB), with the explicit goal “to develop an internationally acceptable set of high qual-
ity financial reporting standards.” (Barth, et al 2008). Although the United States is yet to adopt
IFRS, the standard has been adopted in EU countries by 2005, and majority of MSCI developed
and emerging countries by 2011.
The period of interest in the main analysis is 1997-2014. The lower bound is set on 1997
due to the limited availability of data for firms in emerging countries in pre-1997. Within each
year I exclude firms with missing market value, book value, sales or EBITDA. I also winsorize
the return estimate at 1% to control for the outliers. I use Standard Industry Classification (SIC)
code to sort the firms into industries, following the convention of US Securities and Exchange
Commission (SEC). For within-industry analysis, I focus on the manufacturing industries as they
”are more likely to be motivated by exporter skill and capital abundance.” (Schott, 2004). Also,
these industries are likely to contain ”fewer non-tradables than these other sectors, so that their
actual development paths may more closely resemble the theoretical archetypes described above.”
(Schott, 2003). The summary statistics of the raw data is provided in Table 1. After exclusions
have been applied, the main analysis uses 334,608 firm-years across 42 countries.
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Penn World Table 9.0 provide aggregate capital stock estimate, which is constructed from
the annual investment data using perpetual inventory method. 4 Although Penn World Table is
the highly respected source for macroeconomic data, it is important to note that the Per capita
capital are estimated values, and thus involves measurement errors. For example, capital stock
estimate based on the investment on reproducible goods excludes the land and natural capital that
contributes to the income flow within the economy, an issue which has been raised by Caselli and
Feyrer(2007). Therefore, in their paper they attempt to separate natural capital from reproducible
capital using the World Bank’s data on the land and natural resources, and find that this adjustment
reduces the return gap between advanced and developing economies. Empirical findings of the
previous chapters further suggests that the standard capital accumulation process used to construct
the capital stock estimate is likely erroneous. Therefore, instead of relying on the estimates of
capital stock, I use Purchasing power parity (PPP) adjusted real per capita GDP to proxy for the
per capita capital. In the standard model with two factors and identical technologies, higher per
capita GDP should imply higher per capita capital. For robustness, I do repeat the analysis using
per capita capital stock estimate from PWT 5, and the result remain unchanged.
3.4 Single vs. Multi-cone Heckscher Ohlin Model
One of the most significant conclusion of the Heckscher Ohlin model is Factor Price Equaliza-
tion, which states that ”within a cone of diversification, factor return do not responds to changes
in endowments.”(Schott,2003) Thus, if the world is described by the standard single-cone model,
the return to capital should be equalized across countries. This suggests that one shouldn’t observe
a systematic relationship between the relative endowment and the firm return to capital after one
control for the firm specific risk. Conversely, statistically significant relationship between the firm
return to capital and relative endowment should favor the multi-cone version of H-O model over
the single cone version. Based on this observation, I run the following regression analysis to test
4The detailed description of the method is provided in in Feenstra, et al (2015)
5see results in the appendix
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the two-versions of Heckscher Ohlin model:
qc,t,i,f = α + β1log(PCGDPc,t) + β2Dt + β3Fi + γXc,t,i,f + c,t,i,f (3.8)
• qc,t,i,f : Return to capital for firm f in industry i in country c in period t.
• PCGDPc,t: Purchasing Power Parity adjusted real per capita Capital in country c in period
t (in 2011 US dollars)
• Xc,t,i,f : Vector of firm specific factors, including book value of total assets, book debt-to-
equity ratio, and market to book equity ratio of firm f in industry i in country c in period
t
• Dt: Time dummies
• Fi: Industry dummies
In the regression I control for firm-specific effects such as size, leverage, and price-to-book,
as the model doesn’t account for the firm specific risk. The industry dummies are added to adjust
for industry specific effect as a country may be heavily invested in certain industries, and this
industry bias can potentially skew the results. Time dummies are added to control for the global
macroeconomic shock that may have occurred during the period of analysis. This adjustment
is particularly important since the period of analysis includes the Global Financial Crisis (2007-
2009), which led to a large volatility in the firm earnings and the current value of assets.
The regression result presented in Table 2 shows that the firm productivity decrease with in-
crease in the country’s per capita GDP even after controlling for the firm specific effect. This
empirical result, which shows the systematic relationship between the relative endowment and the
return to capital, favors the multi-cone version of H-O model over the single cone version. This
suggests a weak link among international factor prices, and implies that trade liberalization can
only have a limited effect on the factor price convergence. Thus, wage inequality across coun-
tries should remain even in the world of free trade. The result is consistent for both ROAb and
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ROAv, and the finding is robust across different time periods (2000-2014 and the post-financial
crisis periods). I also repeat the regression using only the Euro-zone countries in 2011-2014 years
to control for the potential effect of the accounting standard difference across the world. Despite
some corrections made by the Worldscope Datastream, the difference across countries still per-
sists, and it may skew the results if it is systematically related to the per capita capital. However, as
shown in table 2, the result remain robust even among the Euro-zone countries that share the same
accounting standards.
3.5 Technology Difference vs. Product Specialization
The findings in the previous section supports the multi-cone model of the Heckscher-Ohlin
model. However, the result may also be due to technology difference (i.e. there is more than one
method to produce a good, and more efficient method is used by the firms in developed countries).
Therefore, in this chapter I investigate the firm-level data to explore the factors that drive the
specialization across countries.
3.5.1 Alternative Explanation: Technology Differences
As stated in the previous sub-section, the negative and statistically significant relationship be-
tween firm return to capital and the relative aggregate endowment observed in the data is inconsis-
tent with the single cone H-O model, and favors the multi-cone approach. However, as mentioned
in the introduction, the cross-country difference in return to capital can also be due to difference in
the level of technology. In eq (3), the model assumes that the countries share the same technology
matrixA′−1, and thus, if the countries produce the same good and price is equalized across coun-
tries, factor price should be identical. However, if the level of technology is positively correlated
with the relative endowment, one should be able to observe a higher return to capital in emerging
countries compared to developed, even when the countries are producing identical goods.
Thus, to test the validity of this alternative explanation, I run the following regression to test
the alternative hypothesis:
(y
k
)
c,t,i,f
= α + β1log(PCGDPc,t) + β2Dt + β3Fi + γXc,t,i,f + c,t,i,f (3.9)
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(
y
k
)
c,t,i,f
is the output-to-capital ratio of the firm f in industry i in country c in time t. I proxy
this using the asset-turnover ratio, which is the ratio between sales and the market value of the
firm’s capital. For ”technology difference” explanation to hold, the output-to-capital ratio should
also be downward sloping due to the equality in eq (2); i.e. if one observe a statistically significant
downward trend between the firm asset turnover and the aggregate relative endowment, then one
cannot rule out the technological difference as the possible explanation for the trend observed in
the previous subsection.
The regression results in Table 3, however, show that the relationship between the aggregate
endowment ratio and firm asset turnover is statistically insignificant across MSCI developed and
emerging countries during 2000-2014 period and even positive during 2011-2014 period. This
suggests that that the observed downward trend between firm ROA and log(PCGDP) more likely
fit the multi-cone model than a single-cone model with technology difference across countries.
On the other hand, among EU countries, one cannot reject the single-cone technology difference
explanation, as the downward slope is statistically significant. This is plausible, as it suggests
that compared to the rest of the world, the aggregate relative endowment among EU countries are
sufficiently similar that they reside in the identical cone of production.
3.5.2 Specialization Within vs. Across Industries
In the traditional H-O model of specialization, the countries are assumed to specialize across
industries as shown in Figure 1. The capital abundant developed countries should specialize in
capital intensive industries (Electronics and Machinery in Figure 1) and labor abundant emerging
countries should specialize in labor intensive industries (Textiles and Food Products in Figure
1). However, in Table 4, I show that there isn’t any 2-digit SIC manufacturing industry that are
exclusive to MSCI developed or emerging countries in 2014.6 In Appendix A show that the only
industry that is exclusive to developed country in 2014 is Legal Services, and there is no industry
that is exclusive to emerging countries. This suggests that specialization does not occur across
6As stated in the previous sub-section, I focus on the manufacturing industries for the intra-industry analysis.
However, the result for other 2-digit SIC industries are also available in the appendix, and are consistent with the
results observed for the manufacturing industries.
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industries as suggested by the traditional H-O model, finding which is consistent with Bowen, et
al (1987).
On the other hand, empirical evidence strongly supports the within-industry specialization that
was suggested in Schott (2003). Table 5 displays the result of estimating the following modified
version of equation (9) within each 2-digit manufacturing industry:
qc,t,f = α + β1log(PCGDPc,t) + β2Dt + γXc,t,f + c,t,f (3.10)
The regression result shows a statistically significant negative relationship between the firm ROA
and log(PCGDP) within most of the 2-digit manufacturing industries; the slope is negative and
statistically significant in 15 industries and is non- and is not significant in 5 industries. Positive
relationship is not observed in any manufacturing industry. If the specialization occurred across
industries, the factor returns should be constant within each industry. The statistically significant
downward trend found in Table 4 suggests that the specialization occurs with-in and not across.
This finding is significant as it suggests that even within the industry, developed and emerging
countries do not engage in a direct competition. This finding also suggests that previous empirical
researches that showed little evidence in favor of endowment driven specialization across industries
cannot rule-out the mutli-cone version of the H-O model. This finding is consistent with Grossman
and Helpman (1991) in that it suggests that the high wage countries continue to lead the emerging
countries over time with its ability to innovate the higher quality product.
3.6 Conclusion
In this paper, I investigated the implication of the H-O model using the firm-level data. The
empirical result supports the multi-cone version of H-O model, over the single-cone version and
suggests that the specialization occur within the industry rather than across. This finding is con-
sistent with Schott (2003, 2004) and suggests that free international trade can only have a limited
impact on the factor price convergence even in the long run.
This paper differs from others in that it used the firm-level accounting data to analyse the
macroeconomic problem. Most of the factor price equalization analysis thus far has focused on
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the cross-country wage difference rather than the return to capital difference due to the difficulty
of measuring the returns at the aggregate economy level.7 In this paper, I attempt to side-step the
issue of aggregate measurement by utilizing the firm-level accounting data. Firm level data has
advantage over macroeconomic data in that it allows direct measurement of capital that is used to
generate income. However, it restricts the analysis to mid-to large-size firms that are listed in the
stock market. One may argue that the return found using only the firm level data is biased upward
as it doesn’t include self-employed workers, or mom-and-pop stores. This is a plausible argument,
and future research on the subject should attempt to address these issues.
In this paper, I have also side-stepped the issue of the tariffs and trade barriers, impediment
to the free trade, which can also cause a cross-country difference in the factor price. The future
research should also investigate how the non-zero trade cost affect the factor price differences
across countries.
7Some has attempted to use the investment return, but as stated in the previous chapters, this can lead to an
erroneous conclusion, as MPK and investment return relationship is not necessarily linear across countries.
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Figure 3.1: Lerner Diagram
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Table 3.1: Data Summary Statistics (1997-2014)
The sample includes all non-financial (all SIC codes except 6000∼6999) balance sheet solvent firm-years in the Worldscope database with 1)
market value(WC08001), assets(WC02999), liabilities(WC03351), depreciation(WC01151), EBITDA(WC18198), extraordinary credit(WC01253)
and extraordinary charge(WC01254) data for the year and; 2) debt and market value data for the previous year in the MSCI developed and
emerging countries (excluding Saudi Arabia, Qatar and UAE) between 1997 and 2014. Purchasing Power Parity (PPP) adjusted per capita GDP
(PCGDP) is calibrated using the PPP adjusted GDP(rgdpo) and the population (pop) estimate from the Penn World Table 9.0. Employed
population (emp), and average hours worked per employed (avh) are also from the Penn World Table 9.0. CPI inflation is from the World Bank
Country wbcode Firm-years
Fama French
Industries
PPP adjusted
PCGDP (2014)
CPI Inflation
(2014)
Population
(2014, millions)
Employed
(2014, millions)
Average Hours
Worked per Employed
(2014)
Australia AUS 14,838 44 44,241 0.025 23.6 12.0 1,803
Austria AUT 1,147 28 45,705 0.016 8.5 4.4 1,629
Brazil BRA 1,450 35 14,811 0.063 206.1 105.9 1,711
Belgium BEL 3,250 38 39,950 0.003 11.2 4.9 1,575
Canada CAN 12,632 44 43,368 0.019 35.6 18.8 1,688
Chile CHL 2,080 30 21,317 0.044 17.8 7.8 1,990
China CHN 20,092 44 12,513 0.020 1,369.4 798.4 NA
Colombia COL 365 24 12,858 0.029 47.8 24.6 1,772
Czech Republic CZE 436 24 29,187 0.003 10.5 5.1 1,771
Denmark DNK 1,890 37 44,423 0.006 5.6 2.8 1,438
Finland FIN 1,929 36 38,343 0.010 5.5 2.6 1,643
France FRA 8,637 43 38,584 0.005 66.1 27.3 1,473
Germany DEU 9,037 43 46,507 0.009 80.6 42.5 1,371
Greece GRC 3,643 37 24,685 -0.013 11.0 4.0 2,042
Hong Kong HKG 11,342 42 45,134 0.044 7.2 3.7 2,234
Hungary HUN 423 23 22,750 -0.002 9.9 4.2 1,860
India IND 17,621 44 5,452 0.064 1,295.3 510.3 2,162
Indonesia IDN 3,826 37 9,798 0.064 254.5 113.0 2,027
Ireland IRL 782 26 51,927 0.002 4.7 1.9 1,821
Israel ISR 3,187 40 31,606 0.005 7.9 3.9 1,880
Italy ITA 3,141 36 35,324 0.002 59.8 23.6 1,734
Japan JPN 52,501 44 35,566 0.027 126.8 65.0 1,729
Malaysia MYS 11,427 42 21,650 0.031 29.9 13.8 2,268
Mexico MEX 1,470 35 15,520 0.040 125.4 51.4 2,137
Netherlands NLD 2,120 39 48,178 0.010 16.9 8.7 1,420
New Zealand NZL 1,385 36 34,066 0.009 4.5 2.4 1,762
Norway NOR 2,260 33 78,293 0.020 5.1 2.7 1,427
Peru PER 986 26 10,931 0.032 31.0 14.7 1,790
Philippines PHL 1,706 33 6,638 0.041 99.1 34.9 2,115
Poland POL 3,053 40 24,450 0.001 38.6 15.8 2,039
Portugal PRT 812 30 27,047 -0.003 10.4 4.3 1,857
Russia RUS 1,869 35 24,056 0.078 143.4 71.9 1,985
Singapore SGP 7,146 43 66,482 0.010 5.5 3.4 2,263
South Africa ZAF 3,621 41 12,067 0.064 54.0 18.3 2,215
South Korea KOR 16,906 43 34,955 0.013 50.1 26.1 2,124
Spain ESP 1,883 36 32,858 -0.001 46.3 17.6 1,689
Sweden SWE 4,761 42 42,605 -0.002 9.7 4.8 1,609
Switzerland CHE 2,936 34 62,637 0.000 8.2 5.0 1,568
Thailand THA 5,740 41 13,725 0.019 67.7 38.9 2,284
Turkey TUR 2,907 36 19,675 0.089 77.5 24.6 1,832
United Kingdom GBR 18,827 44 38,757 0.015 64.3 31.0 1,675
United States USA 69,400 44 51,959 0.016 319.4 148.5 1,765
Total 335,464 44
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Table 3.2: ROA vs. log (PCGDP)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
ROAb ROAb ROAb ROAb ROAv ROAv ROAv ROAv
VARIABLES 97-14 ‘11-14 ‘11-14 IFRS 05-14 EU 97-14 ‘11-14 ‘11-14 IFRS 05-14 EU
log(PCGDP) -0.0404*** -0.0419*** -0.0503*** -0.0280*** -0.0197*** -0.0165*** -0.00968** -0.00936**
(0.00238) (0.00348) (0.00644) (0.00722) (0.00193) (0.00369) (0.00379) (0.00451)
log(Size) 0.0203*** 0.0185*** 0.0165*** 0.0273*** 0.00990*** 0.00855*** 0.00906*** 0.0139***
(0.00211) (0.00403) (0.00423) (0.00186) (0.000796) (0.00172) (0.00185) (0.000601)
Leverage -0.0544*** -0.0576*** -0.0264** -0.0625*** -0.0338*** -0.0333*** -0.0104 -0.0259***
(0.00673) (0.00980) (0.0116) (0.00907) (0.00367) (0.00635) (0.00878) (0.00595)
Price-to-Book -6.04e-05*** -5.03e-05* -0.000190* -0.000115** -2.04e-05** -2.31e-05* -7.71e-05*** -5.56e-05***
(1.60e-05) (2.87e-05) (0.000103) (4.95e-05) (8.19e-06) (1.35e-05) (2.93e-05) (1.92e-05)
Constant 0.315*** 0.319*** 0.426*** 0.148** 0.189*** 0.166*** 0.0597 0.0545
(0.0336) (0.0492) (0.0828) (0.0729) (0.0227) (0.0411) (0.0469) (0.0466)
Year Dummies Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Industry Dummies Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Observations 334,608 88,527 44,640 34,031 334,608 88,527 44,640 34,031
R-squared 0.126 0.140 0.150 0.120 0.127 0.119 0.136 0.116
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Table 3.3: Turnover vs. log(Per capita GDP)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Turnover Turnover Turnover Turnover
VARIABLES 97-14 ‘11-14 ‘11-14 IFRS 05-14 EU
log(PCGDP) 0.0610*** 0.0772** 0.193*** -0.0676
(0.0158) (0.0382) (0.0371) (0.0464)
log(Size) -0.00967** -0.0137* 0.0162*** -0.0250***
(0.00424) (0.00747) (0.00486) (0.00300)
Leverage 0.471*** 0.480*** 0.503*** 0.675***
(0.0270) (0.0407) (0.0498) (0.0522)
Price-to-Book -0.000251*** -0.000250* -0.000494 -0.000426
(7.64e-05) (0.000133) (0.000352) (0.000311)
Constant 0.0742 0.0512 -1.644*** 1.580***
(0.178) (0.425) (0.408) (0.488)
Year Dummies Y Y Y Y
Industry Dummies Y Y Y Y
Observations 334,608 88,527 44,640 34,031
R-squared 0.185 0.180 0.207 0.173
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Figure A.1: Countries with IFRS Standards
1
1Countries included in the sample are highlighted in red or green. Countries colored in red has adopted IFRS by
2017
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Table A.1: Accounting Standard and IFRS Adoption Date by Country
Country Accounting Standard IFRS Adoption Date
Australia IFRS 2005
Austria IFRS 2005
Belgium IFRS 2005
Brazil IFRS 2010
Canada IFRS 2011
Chile IFRS 2010
China* Chinese Accounting Standards 2007
Colombia IFRS 2015
Czech Republic IFRS 2005
Denmark IFRS 2005
Finland IFRS 2005
France IFRS 2005
Germany IFRS 2005
Greece IFRS 2005
Hong Kong IFRS 2005
Hungary IFRS 2005
India India accounting standards NA
Indonesia Indonesian national GAAP NA
Ireland IFRS 2005
Israel IFRS 2008
Italy IFRS 2005
Japan Japanese Accounting Standards NA
Malaysia IFRS 2017
Mexico IFRS 2012
Netherlands IFRS 2005
New Zealand IFRS 2007
Norway IFRS 2005
Peru IFRS 2012
Philippines IFRS 2005
Poland IFRS 2005
Portugal IFRS 2005
Russia IFRS 2012
Singapore Singapore Financial Reporting Standards (SFRS) NA
South Africa IFRS 2011
South Korea IFRS 2011
Spain IFRS 2005
Sweden IFRS 2005
Switzerland Swiss GAAP NA
Thailand Thai Accounting Standards NA
Turkey IFRS 2005
UK IFRS 2005
US US GAAP NA
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Table A.2: Firm and Country Fixed Effects: MPK and IRR for 1996-2014
(1) (2) (3) (1) (2) (3)
Variables ROA ROA ROA IRR IRR IRR
Years 97-14 97-14 97-14 97-14 97-14 97-14
log(PCGDP) -0.0436*** -0.0308*** -0.0197*** 0.0613*** -0.0255 -0.00209
(0.00206) (0.00889) (0.00193) (0.00772) (0.0744) (0.0181)
log(size) 0.0187*** 0.0148*** 0.00990*** -0.0772*** 0.00253 0.000712
(0.000574) (0.000573) (0.000796) (0.00266) (0.00197) (0.00213)
Leverage -0.0798*** -0.0508*** -0.0338*** -0.0601*** -0.114*** -0.121***
(0.00214) (0.00389) (0.00367) (0.0102) (0.0168) (0.0187)
Price-to-Book 4.01e-06 -1.47e-05** -2.04e-05** 0.000344*** 0.000209** 0.000212**
(3.24e-06) (6.84e-06) (8.19e-06) (0.000106) (8.25e-05) (8.39e-05)
Constant 0.329*** 0.220** 0.189*** 0.450*** 0.433 0.154
(0.0204) (0.0932) (0.0227) (0.0763) (0.773) (0.192)
Observations 334,608 334,608 334,608 334,608 334,608 334,608
R-squared 0.037 0.168 0.127 0.070 0.068 0.064
Firm Dummies Y N N Y N N
Year Dummies NA Y N NA Y N
Time Dummies NA Y Y NA Y Y
Industry Dummies NA Y Y NA Y Y
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Table A.3: Country Clusters: MPK and IRR for 1996-2014 and 2011-2014
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Variables ROA ROA IRR IRR
Years 97-14 11-14 97-14 11-14
log(PCGDP) -0.0197*** -0.0165** -0.00209 0.0303**
(0.00605) (0.00720) (0.00731) (0.0124)
log(size) 0.00990*** 0.00855** 0.000712 1.45e-05
(0.00288) (0.00343) (0.00150) (0.00184)
Leverage -0.0338*** -0.0333*** -0.121*** -0.0897***
(0.0112) (0.0119) (0.0128) (0.0135)
Price-to-Book -2.04e-05*** -2.31e-05* 0.000212*** 0.000103
(6.96e-06) (1.36e-05) (7.66e-05) (8.52e-05)
Constant 0.189*** 0.166** 0.154** -0.271**
(0.0688) (0.0787) (0.0735) (0.130)
Observations 334,608 88,527 334,608 88,527
R-squared 0.127 0.119 0.064 0.037
Time Dummies Y Y Y Y
Industry Dummies Y Y Y Y
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Table A.4: Non-Financial 2-digit SIC Industries: Firm ROA
and PCGDP
SIC Code log(PCGDP) log(Size) Leverage Price-to-Book Observations R-squared
1 -0.0245*** 0.0139*** -0.0601*** -0.00413*** 1,915 0.130
2 -0.0238*** 0.00600** -0.0630*** -0.00286*** 823 0.107
7 0.00216 0.00151 0.0212 -0.00217** 422 0.051
8 -0.0177* 0.0163*** -0.0409 -0.00352** 418 0.183
9 -0.0353*** 0.0148*** -0.0253 -0.00231 272 0.210
10 -0.0348*** 0.0332*** -0.0175* 1.32e-05 9,834 0.305
12 -0.0340*** 0.0260*** 0.0277 -1.17e-06 1,902 0.272
13 -0.0112*** 0.0229*** 0.0147* -0.000157 9,821 0.227
14 -0.0485*** 0.0184*** 0.0502*** -0.000139*** 1,034 0.206
15 -0.00136 0.00398*** -0.0620*** -2.81e-06 11,389 0.045
16 -0.0140*** 0.00109 -0.0567*** -0.000645 4,789 0.049
17 -0.00249 0.00397** -0.0932*** -6.02e-05*** 1,621 0.062
20 -0.0144*** 0.00548*** -0.0721*** -0.000232*** 15,460 0.097
21 0.00123 0.00501*** -0.0529*** -0.000489** 481 0.169
22 -0.0243*** 0.00377*** -0.0778*** -0.000656*** 5,077 0.094
23 -0.0160*** 0.00492*** -0.107*** -0.000796*** 3,676 0.112
24 -0.00873** 0.00672*** -0.0604*** -0.00210*** 2,214 0.090
25 -0.0266*** 0.00444*** -0.109*** 0.000459** 1,805 0.105
26 -0.0102*** 0.00275*** -0.0909*** -1.90e-05*** 5,102 0.091
27 -0.00705** 0.00584*** -0.0450*** -0.000580*** 4,922 0.067
28 -0.0416*** 0.0148*** -0.0238*** -6.87e-05** 25,242 0.197
29 0.00325 0.0111*** -0.121*** -0.00159*** 2,060 0.247
30 -0.0216*** 0.00554*** -0.0841*** -0.000718** 4,666 0.109
31 -0.0263*** -0.00127 -0.163*** -0.000408 1,028 0.143
84
32 -0.0156*** 0.00575*** -0.0916*** -0.000348*** 6,831 0.114
33 -0.0169*** 0.00481*** -0.0932*** -0.000621*** 10,213 0.123
34 -0.0134*** 0.00481*** -0.108*** -0.000377* 6,722 0.097
35 -0.0182*** 0.00653*** -0.0453*** -0.000619*** 18,232 0.069
36 -0.0178*** 0.00851*** -0.0286*** -4.78e-05 23,572 0.072
37 -0.0142*** 0.00529*** -0.0639*** -0.000135*** 9,505 0.058
38 -0.0311*** 0.0162*** -0.0283*** -5.46e-05** 11,695 0.135
39 -0.0114*** 0.00275** -0.0838*** -0.000255** 3,107 0.066
40 0.0120* 0.00203* -0.140*** -0.00601** 576 0.241
41 0.0105** 0.00205 -0.110*** -0.00100 977 0.078
42 0.000783 0.00159** -0.0321*** -0.00414*** 3,213 0.038
43 0.105 -0.312 1.105 -0.0810 13 1.000
44 -0.0106*** 0.00236*** -0.0157 -0.00102** 3,947 0.065
45 0.00295 0.00428*** -0.0570*** -0.000217*** 2,204 0.061
46 -0.0362** 0.0120*** -0.0655** 0.000917** 370 0.363
47 -0.00613** 0.00423*** -0.0292** 2.63e-06 1,671 0.047
48 -0.0167*** 0.0152*** -0.0323*** -8.95e-06 9,283 0.181
49 -0.0158*** 0.0101*** -0.0396*** -3.73e-05 11,191 0.118
50 -0.0105*** 0.00649*** -0.0472*** -8.49e-05*** 10,735 0.045
51 -0.0100*** 0.00450*** -0.0662*** -7.57e-06** 6,966 0.057
52 -0.0153*** 0.00195 -0.0607*** -3.03e-05** 794 0.069
53 0.00256 0.00288*** -0.0750*** -0.000241*** 2,811 0.097
54 0.00428* 0.00338*** -0.0305*** -0.00210*** 2,997 0.050
55 -0.0121*** 0.00749*** -0.0515*** -0.00139* 1,543 0.070
56 -0.00347 0.00449*** -0.0593*** -2.06e-05 2,921 0.057
57 0.00652* 0.00677*** -0.0357*** -0.000304 2,015 0.034
58 -0.0159*** 0.00469*** -0.0421*** -0.000120 3,846 0.055
59 -0.0111*** 0.00823*** -0.0400*** -9.74e-05* 4,172 0.058
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70 -0.00895*** 0.00477*** -0.0233*** -1.86e-06 4,104 0.030
72 -0.104*** 0.0166*** -0.0737*** -0.000715 788 0.141
73 -0.0257*** 0.0114*** -0.00358 -8.39e-06 31,394 0.101
75 -0.0181*** 0.0167*** 0.0416* -0.000434* 763 0.209
76 -0.0537 0.00124 -0.0431 0.00164 195 0.061
78 -0.0112** 0.00689*** 0.00485 -7.65e-05 2,129 0.035
79 -0.00651** 0.00890*** -0.0230** -0.000755*** 3,043 0.051
80 -0.0201*** 0.0117*** 0.00940 -0.00148*** 3,151 0.125
81 -0.0556 0.0218 -0.264 0.100* 24 0.891
82 -0.0108** 0.00375** -0.0497*** -0.00121*** 1,317 0.056
83 0.00673 0.0158*** -0.0354 -0.000619*** 285 0.184
84 0.0133 0.00275 -0.0507 -0.00612*** 128 0.257
86 4.235 0.588 3 1.000
87 -0.0285*** 0.0162*** 0.0280** -0.000190** 8,399 0.125
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Table A.5: Non-Financial 2-digit SIC Industries: Firm IRR
and PCGDP
SIC Code log(PCGDP) log(Size) Leverage Price-to-Book Observations R-squared
1 -0.0283* 0.0297*** -0.132*** 0.0282*** 1,915 0.173
2 -0.000291 0.0106 -0.170** 0.00784 823 0.102
7 0.0151 -0.00130 -0.270 0.0325* 422 0.233
8 0.0224 0.0143 -0.129 0.0248*** 418 0.241
9 -0.000509 0.0237*** -0.150 0.122*** 272 0.517
10 -0.0181 0.00377 -0.227*** 0.000322*** 9,834 0.116
12 -0.0270 -0.00553 -0.247* -1.39e-05 1,902 0.110
13 0.00311 0.00338 -0.289*** 0.00328*** 9,821 0.110
14 0.0131 0.00290 -0.273*** 0.000717** 1,034 0.062
15 -0.00154 -0.00470 -0.0788** 0.000446 11,389 0.106
16 0.0161 0.00176 -0.230*** 0.0950*** 4,789 0.260
17 0.0122 -0.00612 -0.0525 0.000396*** 1,621 0.063
20 -0.0108 0.00292 -0.149*** 0.00134 15,460 0.067
21 -0.0383 0.0120 -0.00228 0.00355** 481 0.107
22 0.0159 -0.000329 -0.103** 0.00479* 5,077 0.074
23 0.0193 -0.000489 -0.169*** 0.00504 3,676 0.082
24 0.0178 0.00532 -0.191*** 0.0442*** 2,214 0.210
25 -0.00812 0.00360 -0.153*** 0.00557* 1,805 0.089
26 0.0136 0.000325 -0.126*** 0.000472*** 5,102 0.130
27 0.00471 0.00151 -0.145*** 0.00137 4,922 0.079
28 -0.0103 0.00474 -0.151*** 0.000292 25,242 0.072
29 0.00784 0.00213 -0.255*** 0.00749 2,060 0.153
30 0.00842 0.00267 -0.139*** 0.00328* 4,666 0.094
31 -0.0218 -0.000923 -0.265*** 0.0146 1,028 0.119
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32 -0.00906 0.00397 -0.133*** 0.00470*** 6,831 0.108
33 0.00179 0.000874 -0.103*** 0.00627*** 10,213 0.120
34 -0.00902 0.00256 -0.132*** 0.00977** 6,722 0.128
35 -0.0165 0.00314 -0.114*** 0.00677*** 18,232 0.117
36 0.00150 -0.000685 -0.143*** 0.000315 23,572 0.109
37 -0.00575 -0.00115 -0.115*** 0.000581** 9,505 0.102
38 -0.00569 0.00521 -0.134*** 0.000415** 11,695 0.100
39 -0.00124 0.00259 -0.214*** 0.00406* 3,107 0.082
40 -0.0335 0.0101** -0.194*** 0.0564*** 576 0.219
41 -0.0239 0.00943** -0.147*** 0.00548 977 0.141
42 0.00328 0.000446 -0.195*** 0.0423*** 3,213 0.152
43 0.624 -2.953 11.46 -0.842 13 1.000
44 -0.00235 0.000756 -0.104* 0.00692** 3,947 0.127
45 -0.00552 -0.00401 -0.151*** 0.000796 2,204 0.118
46 0.0616 0.00727 -0.177* 0.0116*** 370 0.436
47 0.0201 0.00360 -0.119** 0.000152*** 1,671 0.094
48 0.0151 -0.00245 -0.0700** 6.89e-05* 9,283 0.128
49 0.00552 -0.00251 -0.0944*** 0.000193 11,191 0.080
50 0.00587 0.00287 -0.107*** 0.000833** 10,735 0.059
51 -0.0128 -0.00201 -0.114*** 7.35e-05* 6,966 0.052
52 -0.0590* 0.0146*** -0.177*** 0.000110** 794 0.148
53 -0.00676 -0.000687 -0.150*** 0.0123*** 2,811 0.217
54 0.0186 -0.00302 -0.126*** 0.0372*** 2,997 0.166
55 0.00852 0.00986** -0.141** 0.00914 1,543 0.092
56 0.0220 0.00799 -0.154*** 0.000317 2,921 0.078
57 -0.0322 0.00892 -0.167*** 0.0264** 2,015 0.158
58 -0.00976 -0.00423 -0.185*** 0.00182 3,846 0.085
59 -0.00123 0.00837* -0.145*** 0.00276*** 4,172 0.080
88
70 0.0120 0.000328 -0.0197 0.000179 4,104 0.073
72 -0.0414 0.0179** -0.108 0.0174* 788 0.073
73 -0.00670 0.00433 -0.151*** 7.87e-05 31,394 0.098
75 0.00928 -0.00908 -0.112 0.00263 763 0.093
76 -0.0225 -0.0107 -0.356* 0.127*** 195 0.384
78 -0.00171 0.000884 -0.0735 0.000298 2,129 0.045
79 0.00563 0.00733* -0.177*** 0.00355** 3,043 0.056
80 -0.000539 0.00862 -0.189*** 0.00847** 3,151 0.078
81 -0.627 0.252 -2.737 0.750** 24 0.956
82 -0.0159 0.00374 -0.256*** 0.0297*** 1,317 0.135
83 0.101 0.00722 -0.270 0.0122*** 285 0.255
84 0.106 0.0206 -0.466** 0.0401** 128 0.301
86 16.50 1.457 3 1.000
87 0.0241 0.00443 -0.0208 0.000994* 8,399 0.063
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Table B.1: ROA vs. log(Per Capita Capital)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
ROAb ROAb ROAb ROAb ROAv ROAv ROAv ROAv
VARIABLES 97-14 ‘11-14 ‘11-14 IFRS 05-14 EU 97-14 ‘11-14 ‘11-14 IFRS 05-14 EU
log(PCK) -0.0159*** -0.0146*** -0.00792*** -0.00730*** -0.0341*** -0.0365*** -0.0394*** -0.0192***
(0.00195) (0.00336) (0.00301) (0.00237) (0.00241) (0.00323) (0.00503) (0.00390)
log(Size) 0.00979*** 0.00853*** 0.00906*** 0.0138*** 0.0201*** 0.0185*** 0.0166*** 0.0273***
(0.000793) (0.00170) (0.00187) (0.000599) (0.00211) (0.00399) (0.00433) (0.00186)
Leverage -0.0329*** -0.0327*** -0.00984 -0.0250*** -0.0528*** -0.0560*** -0.0236* -0.0602***
(0.00370) (0.00635) (0.00883) (0.00590) (0.00681) (0.0101) (0.0121) (0.00904)
Price-to-Book -2.08e-05** -2.31e-05* -7.71e-05*** -5.61e-05*** -6.10e-05*** -5.03e-05* -0.000190* -0.000116**
(8.26e-06) (1.37e-05) (2.92e-05) (1.94e-05) (1.62e-05) (2.92e-05) (0.000102) (5.00e-05)
Constant 0.170*** 0.165*** 0.0533 0.0433 0.292*** 0.309*** 0.367*** 0.0832*
(0.0253) (0.0413) (0.0423) (0.0292) (0.0363) (0.0491) (0.0775) (0.0472)
Year Dummies Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Industry Dummies Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Observations 334,608 88,527 44,640 34,031 334,608 88,527 44,640 34,031
R-squared 0.123 0.119 0.136 0.117 0.123 0.138 0.148 0.120
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Table B.2: Turnover vs. log(per capita Capital)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Turnover Turnover Turnover Turnover
VARIABLES 97-14 ‘11-14 ‘11-14 IFRS 05-14 EU
log(PCK) 0.0568*** 0.0646* 0.134*** -0.150***
(0.0154) (0.0342) (0.0383) (0.0248)
log(Size) -0.00950** -0.0135* 0.0162*** -0.0241***
(0.00424) (0.00748) (0.00532) (0.00308)
Leverage 0.469*** 0.476*** 0.494*** 0.699***
(0.0269) (0.0397) (0.0508) (0.0503)
Price-to-Book -0.000251*** -0.000250* -0.000497 -0.000431
(7.61e-05) (0.000132) (0.000356) (0.000313)
Constant 0.0495 0.0993 -1.213** 2.642***
(0.191) (0.417) (0.475) (0.303)
Year Dummies Y Y Y Y
Industry Dummies Y Y Y Y
Observations 334,608 88,527 44,640 34,031
R-squared 0.185 0.180 0.200 0.178
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